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BY ANY OTHER NAME?: ON BEING "REGARDED AS"
BLACK, AND WHY TITLE VII SHOULD APPLY EVEN IF
LAKISHA AND JAMAL ARE WHITE
ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG*
MARIO L. BARNES**
INTRODUCTION
Forty years after the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,1 scholars Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan reported
the results of their groundbreaking study, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination.' Their study revealed that simply having an
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Kevin Johnson, Evelyn Lewis, Stephen Schnably, Michael Stein, Madhavi Sunder, and
Marty West for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Title VII makes it illegal for an employer "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to ... privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" or "to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
2. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w987 3 .
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African American 3-sounding name significantly decreased one's
opportunity to receive a job interview, regardless of occupation or
industry.4 Based upon an experiment that involved sending identical,
fictitious r6sum6s with an African American-sounding name, such as
Jamal, and a white-sounding name, such as Greg, to the same
employers in Boston and Chicago, Bertrand and Mullainathan found
that r6sum6s with white-sounding names received fifty percent more
callbacks for interviews.5  They further found that race affected
employers' perceptions of higher-quality r6sum6s,6 with r6sum6s
containing white-sounding names receiving thirty percent more
callbacks than those with African American-sounding names.7
The results of Bertrand and Mullainathan's investigation raise
critical questions about the effectiveness of Title VII as a remedy for
and deterrent to race discrimination in the hiring market today,8
especially as employment discrimination has evolved into different
forms. Numerous professors have written articles that criticize current
judicial interpretations of race discrimination under Title VII, in
particular commenting on the failure of federal courts to evaluate
employment cases in a manner that comports with the realities of
racism and the shifting faces of employment discrimination.9  As
Professor Lu-in Wang explained, current antidiscrimination law
neglects the ways in which "unconscious biases . . . can lead [people]
to treat [others] differently based on race, but without intending to or
3. For the purposes of this Article, the terms "black" and "African
American" are used interchangeably. In particular, we use the term "African
American" to refer to specific, black-American creations such as names like Lakisha.
The words "Black" and "White" are capitalized when used as a noun to identify a
racial group.
4. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Id. at 1-3, 10.
6. The authors defined higher-quality r6sum6s as those that listed more labor
market experience, had fewer holes in employment history, included some completion
of a certification degree, identified foreign language skills and awards, and had a higher
likelihood of including an e-mail address. ld, at 2.
7. Id. at 3, 11-12.
8. See Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime:
Rights, Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 468-69 (1995) (highlighting how
complaints to the EEOC alleging discrimination in hiring have significantly decreased
since the 1980s because of evidentiary difficulties in proving discrimination).
9. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719-29 (2001); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1995); Camille Gear Rich,
Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity" Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title
VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1166-71, 1194-99 (2004).
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even being aware that [they] are doing so. "0 Although blatant forms of
racial discrimination still occur in our post-Title VII world,
discrimination on the job market is generally more subtle." It simply is
not as common for an employer to explicitly inform a job applicant that
he or she did not receive an interview or job because of his or her race,
national origin, sex, religion, or age.' 2 At the very least, employers
recognize that such open discrimination may present the threat of
employment litigation for their businesses. 13
This reduction in blatant forms of bigotry, however, has not
signified an end to discrimination in the workplace.' 4 For example, in
10. Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy.- Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling
Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1017 (2004); see also Frank Rudy Cooper,
Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript at 16, on file with authors) (quoting IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 124 (1990) ("Forms of subordination 'have gone
underground, dwelling in everyday habits and cultural meanings of which people are
for the most part unaware."')); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1489, 1498-1528 (2005) (analyzing cognitive psychology studies that demonstrated that
study subjects perform tasks with an unconscious bias based on race).
11. Wang, supra note 10, at 1017.
12. Dais v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
affd, 113 F. App'x 417 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Indeed, because an employer who
discriminates is unlikely to leave a 'smoking gun' attesting to its discriminatory intent,
a victim of discrimination is seldom able to prove his claim by direct evidence and is
usually constrained to rely solely on circumstantial evidence."); see also Angela P.
Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
207, 208 (1996) ("[Tjhe open espousal of racist ideology is now taboo."); Wang, supra
note 10, at 1035 ("To be sure, the discrimination of today is less likely to be as blatant
or crude as the racism of the (not so) distant past .... ); cf Larry Alexander, What
Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 (1992) ("We all know it is wrong to refuse to hire women
as truck drivers, to refuse to let blacks practice law, to bar Moslems from basketball
teams, or to refuse to sit next to Rastafarians at lunch counters.").
13. See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National
Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 860 (1994)
("Most employers know better than to discriminate overtly."); see also Douglas S.
Massey & Garvey Lundy, Use of Black English and Racial Discrimination in Urban
Housing Markets: New Methods and Findings, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 452, 452 (2001)
(noting that after the Fair Housing Act was passed, "outright refusals to rent to
African-Americans became rare, given that overt discrimination might lead to
prosecution").
14. Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-claiming the
Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66
U. PITT. L. REV. 455, 463-64 (2005) ("But, while civil rights laws have removed some
barriers and impacted some decision-making practices in some hiring and promotion
contexts, they have done little to address de facto discrimination."). In addition to
Bertrand and Mullainathan's work, another recent study, where black and white college
students posed as job applicant testers for 350 employers in the Milwaukee area, found
that Whites who admitted to having served eighteen months in prison for a drug
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many instances, employers rely on proxies for race, national origin,
sex, religion, or age to exclude an applicant as a job contender or to
discriminate against an employee in another manner. Indeed, numerous
plaintiffs over the age of forty have filed age discrimination lawsuits
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 15
alleging that they were terminated from their jobs because of the
potential value of their pensions if vested and their employers' desire to
avoid the costs of honoring such pensions, a factor that correlates
highly with age. 16 As a general matter, federal courts have denied these
claims, reasoning that such discrimination is not based on an
impermissible factor under the ADEA. According to these courts,
discrimination based on pensions or other like factors is just that,
discrimination based on those factors, and not illegal discrimination
based on a forbidden trait.17  Indeed, although race discrimination
possession conviction received callbacks seventeen percent of the time, whereas crime-
free Blacks received callbacks only fourteen percent of the time. See Devah Pager,
The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. OF SOC. 937, 950-51, 955-57 (2003); see
also David Wessel, Racial Discrimination: Still at Work, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2003,
at A2, available at http://www.careerjounal.com/myc/diverse/20030916-wessel.html
(discussing Pager's study and the Bertrand and Mullainathan study and contrasting their
results with Gallup poll results showing that fifty-five percent of Whites, but only
seventeen percent of Blacks, believe minorities have the same job opportunities as
Whites). In an earlier study, scholars Marc Bendick, Charles Jackson, and Victor
Reinoso compiled data from the Fair Employment Council ("FEC") of Greater
Washington, Inc., the University of Colorado, and the Urban Institute ("UI"), which
each sent testers of different races but with nearly identical rdsum6s to apply for jobs in
markets in Chicago, Denver, San Diego, and Washington, D.C. Marc Bendick, Jr. et
al., Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments, 23 REv.
BLACK POL. ECON. 25, 27-29 (1994). The study found that discrimination-described
to exist where the minority was treated worse than the white partner in the testing
pair-negatively affected African American testers twenty-four percent of the time, and
Latinos twenty-two percent of the time (for FEC testers) and twenty percent of the time
(for UI testers). Id. at 29-31 tbls.1 & 2. One very significant result was that for the
Latino and white tester pairs in the UI data-where Latinos were negatively affected by
discrimination twenty percent of the time-the study used either rdsum6s or phone calls,
rather than live inquiries, to apply for positions in San Diego and Chicago. See id. at
30 tbl. 1.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (providing that it is unlawful for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age"). Significantly, like
Title VII with regard to race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, the ADEA seeks
to prevent discrimination "because of" an individual's age. Id.
16. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 606-07 (1993); cf
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 590-600 (2004) (rejecting
"reverse" age discrimination claims of younger workers who asserted that changes to a
company's health and retirement benefits plans favored older workers over younger
workers).
17. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 608-11.
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differs from age discrimination in several significant ways, 18 federal
courts have also held, in the very few cases addressing the issue, that
proxy discrimination based on factors that correlate highly with race
cannot be remedied under Title VII.19
Outside of the context of age discrimination and, to some extent,
national origin discrimination, very few scholars have examined the
problem of proxy discrimination.2 0  Although some scholars have
18. See Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things Is Not Like the Other:
Analogizing Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L.
REV. 839, 842-51 (2003) (describing some of the dissimilarities between discrimination
against people of color and discrimination against older workers); see also Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). The Kimel Court raised a difference between
age and race discrimination when it remarked "[olider persons, again, unlike those who
suffer discrimination on the basis of race or gender, have not been subjected to a
'history of purposeful unequal treatment."' Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (citing Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976)); see also Smith v. City of Jackson, 351
F.3d 183, 193 (5th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 2, 6
(1965), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT 16 (1981) (detailing how age discrimination differs from race
discrimination, including the fact that age prejudice, unlike race prejudice, is distinct
"because the process of aging 'is inescapable, affecting everyone who lives long
enough,' regardless of distinct social and economic environments")).
19. See, e.g., McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL
755779, at *2-3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996); cf Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 375 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("No matter how closely
tied or significantly correlated to race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be,
the strike does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race.").
Outside the context of Title VII cases, courts have recognized that names are unlawfully
used as a proxy for national origin and race. See Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488,
491, 499-503 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the conduct of INS agents was without a
rational basis and violative of the Fourth Amendment where the agents' only basis for
investigation and seizure of the petitioner was his "Nigerian-sounding name"); Ill.
Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1070 (7th Cir. 1976), modified en banc on
other grounds, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (restating the rule that INS officers may
stop suspects only when there is a "reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable
facts" and declaring that "Spanish surnames and appearance of Mexican ancestry" are
not sufficient justifications).
20. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection
of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 371-81, 390-91 (analyzing discrimination
against black women based on hairstyle); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working
Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1279-1308 (2000) (describing how women and
people of color attempt to alter their racial identities in order to prevent discrimination
and preempt stereotyping in the workplace); see also Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8
Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act's New Frontier, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
155, 155-60 (1996) (arguing that landlords use entitlement to Section 8-a federal
subsidized housing program-as a proxy for "other legally prohibited kinds of
discrimination, such as that based on race, ethnicity, [and] national origin;" and
proposing "an amendment to the Fair Housing Act that would prohibit private landlords
from discriminating against prospective tenants because of their status as rental subsidy
1288 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
explored the dangers in using race as a proxy for work-related
criteria," only a few have examined how the performance of one's
racial identity may affect employment and promotion prospects.*2 None
have examined when outside factors such as names are used as proxies
for determining the race of an applicant in order to exclude him or her
at a business' point of entry. Additionally, none have analyzed how to
address individual proxy discrimination in hiring as it relates to race in
light of theories regarding the social construction of race,23 in particular
what it means to be correctly or incorrectly perceived as belonging to a
certain racial group on the hiring market.24 Here, the real disease of
racial discrimination is the social construct of race as disabling for
certain racial groups, meaning that the pathology of racism results in
presumptions of disability that are viewed as flowing from a certain
holders"); Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the
Forgotten, 86 CAL. L. REV. 315, 316-19 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
theory of wrongful discrimination under the Equal Protection doctrine is flawed in its
failure to recognize the distinction between proxy discrimination, which involves
persons using traits as a tool-a means to an end-to identify or target a class of
persons, and nonproxy discrimination, where the classification is its own end); Kevin
R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of Proposition
227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1247-63 (2000)
(analyzing discrimination against people of Mexican descent in California through the
use of language in Proposition 227).
21. See Reaves, supra note 18, at 851-52; cf Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race
as Proxy, and Relgion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059, 2059 (1996) (arguing that if
race can be used as a proxy for a person's "experiences, outlooks, and ideas" within
the context of measuring diversity for affirmative action purposes, then it might also be
appropriate to use race as such a proxy in other contexts like employment).
22. See, e.g., Carbado & Gulati, supra note 20, at 1279-1308; Rich, supra
note 9, at 1140.
23. By social construction, we mean that identity categories such as race are
not biologically determined, but instead gain their power and meaning from social
relations. Certainly, sociologist Erving Goffman's work on social stigma is instructive
in this area. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED
IDENTITY 2 (1963) (explaining that society places people into categories with attendant
ascribed attributes that effectively constitute a social identity). The ascribed identity
provides a tool to negatively differentiate, so that a person can be "reduced in our
minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one." Id. at 3; see also
Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27 (1994) (asserting that race
is a category of no biological significance, but it "is constructed along cultural,
political, and economic lines" and affects most aspects of our lives).
24. We limit our arguments solely to hiring discrimination cases in which
proxies are used to determine race, but we recognize that our arguments may extend to
other areas, such as gender and other types of discrimination claims.
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racial status, for example, blackness, which is not just about skin color
but the social meaning attached to it.
25
Applying theories concerning the social construction of race, this
Article borrows from the definition of disability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)26 and the courts' analyses of
disability discrimination cases under the "regarded as" disabled
provision of the ADA, which allows a plaintiff to bring a claim against
an employer who regards the plaintiff as having an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity.27 Using the "regarded as"
provision as a model, this Article proposes a new method for
recognizing discrimination claims based on the use of proxies for
race-even when those proxies have been used in a way that mistakenly
identifies someone as belonging to a certain race. In other words, we
recognize that it is not physical race but the presumptions of
"disability," or rather the constructed social meanings of race, that
trigger both conscious and unconscious forms of discrimination. This
Article argues that to redress discrimination in the workplace, courts
must recognize employment discrimination claims where one is, for
example, "regarded as" black, with all of the socially ascribed negative
stereotypes of the group.28
Part I of this Article examines and exposes the ways in which race
is socially constructed and analyzes several studies, including that of
Bertrand and Mullainathan, to demonstrate how the construction of race
by cultural and social factors can have damaging effects on the job
market and in general society for those perceived as belonging to
certain racial groups. Part II analyzes the current framework for
evaluating individual disparate treatment cases based on race, describes
how federal courts have mostly failed to recognize the way in which
characteristics such as race are socially constructed and carry socially
significant racial meanings, and details such courts' general treatment
of proxy discrimination claims brought under various antidiscrimination
25. See Michele Goodwin, Race As Proxy: An Introductio, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 931, 933 (2004) ("Color is linked with laziness, incompetence, and hostility, as
well as disfavored political viewpoints, such as a lack of patriotism and disloyalty to the
United States."). We want to make clear that we are not claiming that being black in
itself is disabling, but rather negative stereotypes that are often attached to or imposed
upon Blacks in the employment context have a disabling effect on employment
conditions and opportunities.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2000). The ADA defines disability as (1)
having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; (2)
having a record of such a physical or mental impairment; or (3) being "regarded as"
having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1996).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
28. Goodwin, supra note 25, at 932.
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statutes.29 Part III of the Article argues that current case law ignores
the fact that this form of decision-making based on proxies for race is a
form of racial stereotyping and is actually disparate treatment based on
race. It then borrows from a framework used in proving disability
discrimination under the ADA to recommend a novel approach for
courts to use in evaluating cases where a proxy for race was used to
discriminate against a person-that is, where a plaintiff is "regarded as"
belonging to a certain racial group, with all of the attendant socially
ascribed negative stereotypes of the group. Finally, this Article
concludes by explaining the importance of maintaining the effectiveness
of Title VII by judicially interpreting such legislation in a manner that
comports with the realities of racism and race discrimination.
I. NAME THAT RACE: ON BEING "REGARDED As" BLACK AND THE
SOCIAL MEANING OF RACE
To win a race discrimination in hiring claim under the disparate
treatment theory, an individual plaintiff may either use direct evidence
of discriminatory intent or employ the three-step McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework3' to establish discrimination with indirect
29. This Article does not address Title VII claims filed under the disparate
impact theory, which addresses employment practices that are facially neutral but
cannot be justified by business necessity and disproportionately affect one group. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). Claims filed under this
theory are, in a sense, claims challenging the use of a "proxy" or factor that is not race
but is instead an indirect way of excluding or discriminating against persons because of
race. Although age, unlike race, had previously not been a legitimate basis for
establishing a claim under the disparate impact theory, the Supreme Court recently held
that the ADEA also authorized recovery for discrimination under the disparate impact
theory in Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005). For an argument that
antidiscrimination law should move away from the dichotomous intent-impact
distinction and instead focus on how courts reason about discrimination claims brought
under either doctrinal label, see Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidlscrimination Law:
Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1469, 1470-71 (2005).
30. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, When Different Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of
Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 53, 54-55 (1999). A plaintiff may also prove discrimination
under the mixed motive theory. Under this theory, he or she may use either direct or
circumstantial evidence to prove that his or her protected class was a motivating factor
in the employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000); Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). If the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer may not
escape liability, but may limit the remedies available to the plaintiff by proving that the
employer would have made the same decision even without any discrimination. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
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evidence. 3 To demonstrate discrimination under this framework, a
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of race discrimination by
proving the following four factors: (1) he or she belongs to a minority
group; (2) he or she applied for and was qualified for the position at
issue; (3) despite his or her qualifications, he or she was not hired; and
(4) after his or her rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applications from other individuals.32 If the
plaintiff establishes these factors, the court then draws an inference of
discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer, who must
articulate a legitimate explanation for rejecting the plaintiff's
application.33 If the employer does not satisfy this minimal burden, the
31. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Dais v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 168 F.
Supp. 2d 62, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Some scholars argue that the Supreme Court's
decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), will revolutionize
disparate treatment law in that it will eliminate any distinctions between cases involving
proof by direct evidence and indirect evidence. For example, Professor Michael
Zimmer argues that,
Desert Palace may go well beyond its immediate predecessors in the
McDonnell Douglas line of cases by creating the basis for a uniform method
of proof for individual discrimination cases that focuses on the evidence and
the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, all without regard to
differentiated rules regarding proof structures.
Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law." Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither
McDonnell Douglas, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1891, 1922-33 (2004).
32. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If a plaintiff wants to establish his
or her disability discrimination claim with indirect evidence, he or she will follow the
same basic framework that is utilized in race discrimination cases under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis. See Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d
1173, 1186-87 (6th Cir. 1996). Only then, the factors of the prima facie case will be
changed to include: proof that (1) "he or she is disabled"; (2) he or she is "otherwise
qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation"; (3) he or she
"suffered an adverse employment decision"; (4) "the employer knew or had reason to
know of the plaintiff's disability"; and (5) "the position remained open while the
employer sought other applicants or the disabled individual was replaced." See id. at
1186. Because in some instances the employer may lawfully rely on a plaintiffs
disability to reach its adverse employment decision, federal courts analyze these
disability discrimination cases under another standard. Id. In cases where the plaintiff
has direct evidence that the employer relied on his or her disability in making an
adverse employment decision, or if the employer admits reliance on the handicap, the
framework under which the case is analyzed is as follows: (1) the plaintiff must first
establish that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the plaintiff
must then establish that he or she is "otherwise qualified" for the position despite his or
her disability, either without accommodation from the employer or with a proposed
reasonable accommodation; and (3) the employer finally must prove that a challenged
job criterion is essential, and therefore, a business necessity, or that a proposed
accommodation will impose an undue hardship upon the employer. Id.
33. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (noting that the burden on the defendant is only
a burden of production, not a burden of proof).
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plaintiff automatically prevails.34 However, if the employer satisfies
this burden, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's reason is a
pretext for discrimination to win his or her case.35 The plaintiff may do
this simply by disproving the employer's asserted reason for its
decision.36
For years, scholars have criticized federal courts' interpretation of
this framework and of antidiscrimination law in general as being
inadequate for addressing and eliminating discrimination in the
workplace.37 For example, Professor Charles Lawrence has detailed
the ways in which antidiscrimination law in employment is essentially
ill-equipped to correct for deeply entrenched notions of white
34. The underlying rationale for this result was most clearly explained by the
Supreme Court in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), in
which the Court declared:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this largely because
we know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in
a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a
business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's
actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume
acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible
consideration such as race.
Id. at 577 (citation omitted).
35. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The Court held that:
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion .... This burden now
merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been
the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
Id. (citation omitted).
36. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)
(asserting that the jury may find against the employer but is not required to do so where
the plaintiff has disproved the employer's asserted justification); see also St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-12 (1993). In Hicks, the Supreme Court
explained that even where the plaintiff proves that the employer's proffered reason is
false, the court is not required to find that discrimination has occurred. Id. at 507-08.
The fact finder may still find for the employer if the fact finder believes that the
employer's actions were not motivated by race. See id. at 511.
37. See, e.g., Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking
Glass: Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 Hous.
L. REV. 1517, 1521 (1995) (asserting that Title VII does not facilitate upward mobility
for minorities in internal labor markets).
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supremacy.38 Additionally, Professor Emily M.S. Houh has utilized
contract law, in particular the doctrine of good faith, to explain the
ways in which law and culture evolve slowly even in the face of
progressive beliefs about race and thus fail to account for the special
burdens placed upon minorities in the workplace.39  Likewise,
Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have explored how
antidiscrimination law fails to account for the manner in which racial
and gender stereotyping disadvantage racial minorities and women in
the workplace by forcing them to "work" their identities such that their
actions counter harmful stereotypes in their occupations.' In sum,
scholars have generally analyzed antidiscrimination law in employment
as disregarding and failing to account for the social realities of racism.
In particular, they have argued that the law fails to properly incorporate
antisubordination principles, which inquire whether rules or practices
work to subordinate one group over another and examine discrimination
as part of a larger societal structure that reinforces the subordination of
oppressed minority groups.41
The repudiation of antisubordination principles also harms
plaintiffs who file race discrimination claims by failing to acknowledge
that race is not purely a physical concept but also a social construct.
Current interpretations of race-based antidiscrimination law in
employment rest on the notion of physical race-that is, discrimination
against a person with a certain skin color or other physical features that
signal membership in a particular racial group.42 This understanding of
38. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 329-44 (1987) (explaining
the nature of unconscious racism); see also Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble:
Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1923, 2003
(2000) ("[T]his model of discrimination... works to identify intentional wrongdoers
and demonstrable victims, but leaves untouched unconscious racism, everyday
cognitive bias, and institutional structures that faithfully perpetuate patterns of racial
subordination."). But see Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir.
1999) (finding that Title VII pertains if the discrimination is "because of" race and that
"[this is so regardless of whether the employer consciously intended to base the
evaluations on race, or simply did so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias").
39. Houh, supra note 14, at 461 (asserting that the "cultural legacies" of what
had been legal forms of white supremacy "are much more difficult to transform because
the myriad apparatuses of their transmission lack the purportedly transparent structure
and process of legal reform").
40. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 20, at 1260-62 (describing how members of
subordinated groups must do extra identity work on the job to negate the imposition of
harmful stereotypes associated with outsider group members).
41. See KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, ANGELA P. HARRIS & DEBORAH L. RHODE,
GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 533 (3d ed. 2002).
42. Rich, supra note 9, at 1140 ("Courts have held that an employer only will
be held liable under Title VII when she sanctions an employee because the employee
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race as a physical concept is most evident in the way courts have
treated the last prong of the prima facie case test under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. Under this prong, an inference of
racial discrimination is created (assuming the other three factors exist)
if the plaintiff was treated differently than a similarly situated individual
outside of his or her racial group, a factor that makes it much more
difficult for a plaintiff to prove discrimination if he or she was replaced
with someone of his or her own race.43 For example, in Jefferies v.
Harris County Community Action Association," the Fifth Circuit
rejected a black plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination in promotion
because the person who was ultimately granted the promotion for which
the plaintiff had applied was also black.45
involuntarily displays a biological, visible or palpable characteristic associated with a
disfavored racial or ethnic group."); see generally Roy L. Brooks, Race As An Under-
Inclusive and Over-Inclusive Concept, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 9, 12-27 (1994)
(arguing that the sociological or "civil rights concept of race" has traditionally been
defined by phenotypic differences such as facial features, skin color, and hair, but that
this understanding is too narrow or "underinclusive" because it forces us to separately
look at experiences of subordination across social groups).
43. Two U.S. Supreme Court justices have recently reaffirmed this point. See
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 616 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Title
VII and other antidiscrimination laws and asserting that "Discrimination, as typically
understood, requires a showing that a claimant received differential treatment vis-A-vis
members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily described characteristic.");
id. at 611 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Thomas' assessment of the
showing required to prove discrimination). Courts, however, have recognized the
potential for the occurrence of racial discrimination in situations where an employer
replaced the plaintiff with someone of his or her own race. See, e.g., Kendrick v.
Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[C]omparison to
a person outside of the [plaintiffs] protected class ... is unnecessary to create an
inference of discriminatory discharge."); Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d
157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1996) ("That one's replacement is of another race, sex, or age
may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but it is neither a sufficient nor a
necessary condition."); Jones v. W. Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th
Cir. 1982) (rejecting that an absolute requirement for a prima facie case is a showing
that, after the plaintiffs discharge, the defendant hired a person who was not in the
plaintiffs protected class). Courts have also allowed racial and sexual harassment
claims to move forward under Title VII where the employer and the employee were the
same race. See, e.g., Bland v. New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d 526 (2003); cf Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76 (1998); (finding that for sex-
discrimination premised upon harassment, a Title VII discrimination claim may arise
"because of" sex in cases where the employer and employee are the same gender).
44. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). For an excellent discussion of the
difficulties of asserting claims at the intersection of race and gender under Title VII, see
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
45. Id. at 1030. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit relied on Adams v. Reed, a sex
discrimination case, in which the court reasoned that "where both the person seeking to
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This Part of the Article applies racial formation theory within the
context of employment discrimination to show that race is not purely
biological and argues that discrimination based on proxies that highly
correlate with race, such as name and voice, should be covered under
Title VII. Specifically, Part L.A briefly explains theories regarding the
social construction of race, and Part I.B details the results of several
studies on discrimination that effectively demonstrate the role of
socially constructed racial characteristics in perpetuating present-day
discrimination in the workforce.
A. Race as a Social Construct
It is readily accepted among race scholars, including sociologists,
that race, although considered primarily in terms of physical features,
carries different meanings based upon societal understandings of
particular groups. In other words, discrimination against racial
minorities, Blacks in particular, is not merely the result of an aversion
to dark skin in itself, but to what that dark skin signifies.46 For many
employers, dark skin has signified laziness, unproductivity, and other
stereotypes that have wrongfully been associated with all black
workers. 4
be promoted and the person achieving that promotion were women, 'because the person
selected was a woman, we cannot accept sex discrimination as a plausible explanation
for [the promotion] decision."' Id. (quoting Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th
Cir. 1978) (alteration in original)). The court did, however, recognize that the plaintiff
may have a claim as a black female-a claim based on both race and sex combined-
stating:
The essence of Jefferies' argument is that an employer should not escape
from liability for discrimination against black females by a showing that it
does not discriminate against blacks and that it does not discriminate against
females. We agree that discrimination against black females can exist even
in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women.
Id. at 1032.
46. In essence, skin color merely acts as a label for the constructed identity. As
one scholar has surmised, "Once labels are applied to people, ideas about people who
fit the label come to have social and psychological effects." KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH,
THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 66 (2005); see also Rich, supra note 9, at 1148 (describing
how certain features are used to make "racist or ethnically-biased generalizations about
an individual's physical or intellectual potential").
47. See Cooper, supra note 10 (manuscript at 25) (asserting that black men
"are often subject to stereotypes that negatively influence [their] attributed identity and
therefore require [them] to do extra identity work in order to achieve hiring and
promotion"); Goodwin, supra note 25, at 932 ("Historians comment that blacks were
perceived as too immature, unsophisticated, and intellectually inferior to properly
exercise the rights granted to citizens."); see also Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A
Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1714-24 (2000) (examining advantages
that may attach to lightness of skin).
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To this end, numerous scholars have challenged and criticized the
idea of race as a mere biological fact, demonstrating the ways in which
race is formed and transformed under a constantly shifting society. For
example, Professors Michael Omi and Howard Winant have theorized
about how race is formed in society through a sociohistorical process
that may transform, create, or eliminate racial categories.48 Likewise,
Professor Ian Haney L6pez has explained the ways in which race,
although often signaled by phenotype, is a social construct.49 Indeed, in
addition to physical features, race can and has been defined by a variety
of identifying factors, such as class, geography, and politics.
5 °
Because race is not purely physical but also socially constructed,
racial discrimination often takes the form of unfavorable treatment
based upon socially constructed ideas about characteristics that are
viewed as being linked to a particular racial group. 51 As Professor Juan
Perea once explained, "Identifying traits need not ... be physical. In
our culture, foreign-sounding names, like corresponding accents or
languages, often elicit prejudice." 52
Indeed, several recent studies have demonstrated the ways in
which race is socially constructed around characteristics that have come
to signal or gain meaning as a defining feature of a racial group and, as
a result, have created a basis on which employers and others may
discriminate against an individual due to race-based associations or
prejudices toward such characteristics." 3 In the same way that people
"often link color with undesirable personal qualities such as laziness,
incompetence, and hostility, '' 54 they also often link factors, such as
48. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s 55-61 (2d ed. 1994).
49. See Haney L6pez, supra note 23, at 10-11.
50. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 13, on file with authors).
51. See Goodwin, supra note 25, at 932-34; see also Cooper, supra note 10
(manuscript at 9) (stating that "societal discourses about the meaning of different
identity categories interact with one another to differentiate between people who are
members of a certain race and those who are members of that same race").
52. Perea, supra note 13, at 837.
53. See Rich, supra note 9, at 1158 ("[People] maintain beliefs about the
dialects, aesthetics, and mannerisms that signal one's race or ethnic status."); Perea,
supra note 13, at 835 (asserting that "perceptible differences that mark out-groups
include," among other things, speech or accent, names, and place of residence).
54. Wang, supra note 10, at 1013-14; cf Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1724-45 (1993) (asserting that whiteness tends to
be associated with rights and privileges in the context of property); Thomas Ross, The
Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1, 34-40 (1990) (discussing how the rhetoric of whiteness often symbolizes
innocence).
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name or voice, with color and race and any attendant negative
stereotypes. In other words, characteristics such as a person's name or
voice can, in some instances, "carry enough ethnic meaning
to ... burden [his or her] daily existence with stereotypes imposed by
others. ,5
The next section of this Article, Part I.B, will discuss several
features that are often used as proxies for determining an individual's
race, in particular a person's name and voice or accent.56 Part I.B. 1
focuses on the use of names as proxies for race in social and legal
situations, and Part I.B.2 concentrates on the use of voice, or the sound
of a voice specifically, as a proxy for race, ethnicity, and national
origin under similar circumstances.
B. The Operation of Proxies for Race
1. NAME
In the post-Civil Rights Era, where employers are readily aware
that outward racial prejudices are not a legally acceptable basis for
making employment decisions, employers can and do use proxies for
race, both consciously and unconsciously, as a means of excluding
55. Perea, supra note 13, at 838 (discussing name changes in particular).
56. These categories are, of course, not exhaustive. For instance, credit-
worthiness can be used as a proxy for race. Even where Blacks and Whites have poor
credit histories, opportunities still appear to be dispersed along racial lines. See David
G. Blanchflower et al., Discrimination in the Small Business Credit Market, 84 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 930, 930 (2003) (asserting that there is qualitative and quantitative
evidence that Blacks are discriminated against in the receipt of small business loans
even where they have similar credit histories to nonblack applicants); see also Cecil J.
Hunt II, in the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory Lending
Under A New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REv. 211, 211 (2003)
(claiming that race and not credit risk is the real issue in the lending market and that,
through use of economic profiling, race becomes "a proxy for market weakness and
exploitability, without regard to the income or particular credit worthiness of the
individual"). Credit-worthiness matters within the context of Title VII because of a
recent trend among employers to require credit checks for potential employees. See
Diana Scott, The Unruly Rules on Employee Background Checks, CAL. LAW., Jan.
2004, at 17. As Blacks are disproportionately represented among the poor, they tend to
have lower credit scores. Employers that set minimum credit scores as requirements
for employment and promotion would tend to disproportionately eliminate Blacks from
the hiring pool and advancement opportunities. While credit-worthiness can serve as
another type of proxy for race, it is not clear that this and other conditions that correlate
along racial lines carry the saliency of traits like names and voice, which also implicate
a stronger bias-one where actors consciously and unconsciously discriminate without
proof that they are only affecting members of the disfavored group.
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certain workers from jobs.57 For example, as stated in the Introduction
of this Article, two scholars, Bertrand and Mullainathan, conducted a
study on employment discrimination in hiring that demonstrated the
ways in which job applicants face discrimination entirely based on
social signals of race due to their names,58 in particular whether their
names sounded like African American or white names.59 In fact, in
these experimental cases, the Boston- and Chicago-area employers that
were sent the identical fictitious r6sum6s of applicants with both
African American and white-sounding names never saw faces for the
matching fictitious applicants, nor did they have any means for
determining the race of an applicant other than the applicant's names
themselves. 6° Yet, those with African American-sounding names stood
at a significant disadvantage in the callback process, with applicants
with white-sounding names receiving fifty percent more callbacks.61 In
essence, an applicant with a white-sounding name and no markers that
identified him or her as black could expect one callback for every ten
job advertisements while an African American "would need to apply to
57. Cf Cooper, supra note 10 (manuscript at 31) ("The mainstream accepted
the civil rights movement's basic premise that some blacks warrant inclusion, but
rejected taking that principle to its fullest extent.").
58. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 2, 7-8; see also Bill Maxwell,
Names of Pride or Labels for Stereotypes?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 12,
2003, at 19A, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2003/02/12/newspf/Columns/
Namesof pride or lab.shtml (describing an incident in which Maxwell spoke to a
classroom, turned his back to the students, and correctly guessed whether each student
was white or African American based on first name alone).
59. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 2 ("We experimentally
manipulate[d] perception of race via the name on the r6sum."). In selecting names
that were either white-sounding or African American-sounding, Bertrand and
Mullainathan "use[d] name frequency data calculated from birth certificates of all
babies born in Massachusetts between 1974 and 1979" and "tabulate[d] these data by
race to determine which names [were] distinctively White and which [were]
distinctively African American." Id. at 7; see also Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D.
Levitt, The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black Names, 119 Q. J. EcoN.
767, 769-70 (2004). The authors found that,
Even among popular names, racial patterns are pronounced. Names such as
DeShawn, Tyrone, Reginald, Shanice, Precious, Kiara, and Deja are quite
popular among Blacks, but virtually unheard of for Whites. The opposite is
true for names like Connor, Cody, Jake, Molly, Emily, Abigail, and
Caitlin. Each of those names appears in at least 2,000 cases (between 1989-
2000), with less than 2 percent of the recipients Black.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
60. See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 2, 6-9 (noting that they
restricted themselves to "resumes posted more than six months prior to the start of the
experiment").
61. Id. at 2-3, 10 & tbl.1.
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15 different ads to achieve the same result., 6 2  As Bertrand and
Mullainathan asserted, "a white name yield[ed] as many more callbacks
as an additional eight years of experience" would have yielded for an
African American. 63
Additionally, Bertrand and Mullainathan found that the gap
between black and white job applicants widened with r~sum quality.64
Although higher quality r~sum~s6 generally resulted in higher callback
rates, the benefit of having a higher quality r~sum for a perceived
African American applicant was statistically insignificant but was
statistically significant for those perceived to be white applicants.66 The
callback rate for white applicants with a higher quality r~sum was
eleven percent compared to 8.8 percent for those with lower quality
r~sums, with a statistically significant difference of 2.51 percentage
points or thirty percent.67 However, black applicants with higher
quality r~sum~s received callbacks 6.99 percent of the time, compared
to 6.41 percent of the time for those with lower quality r~sums,
resulting in just a .58 percent difference in percentage points, or nine
percent.68
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 3, 10 & tbl.5.
64. Id. at 3, 12 ("Discrimination therefore appears to bite twice [for African
Americans], making it harder not only for African Americans to find a job but also to
improve their employability.").
65. See supra note 6 (defining higher quality r6sum6s as those that had more
labor market experience, fewer holes in the employment history, an e-mail address,
some certification degree, foreign language skills, and some honors).
66. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 12 & tbl.4.
67. Id.
68. Id. As part of a story on 20/20 in 2004, ABC News conducted its own
study by posting on popular job websites twenty-two pairs of names with identical
resumes. The only difference, again, was the name on each pair of documents. They
found that "the white r6sum6s were actually downloaded 17 percent more often by job
recruiters looking for candidates." 20/20.- Can a Name Hold You Back in Job Search?
(ABC television broadcast Sept. 20, 2004) (transcript on file with authors). Black
participants in the study responded as follows:
CARITA (PARTICIPANT): I was just blown away. Kathleen got
phone call[s] for three of the four weeks of the study and I didn't get any.
And Kathleen-does not exist. There is no Kathleen.
JAMI FLOYD (ABC NEWS): Arsenetta was envious of her made-
up white counterpart Kimberly.
ARSENETTA (PARTICIPANT): They were calling her morning
noon and night. I was sitting there looking at my phone going, I want to
answer that phone call and tell the man I'm interested in the job.
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After the results of Bertrand and Mullainathan's study were
revealed, numerous reporters interviewed human resources employees
to verify the results, finding that in many instances such employees
were encouraged, if not ordered, to eliminate applications or r6sum6s
with African American-sounding names.69 Indeed, some job applicants,
who are readily aware of hiring biases based on ethnic-sounding names,
have purposefully used names other than their own on their r6sum6s to
apply for jobs.7" These job applicants might include a Latino Guillermo
who becomes William or a black Tyree who simply becomes Ty. In
fact, numerous actors and actresses of color have changed their names
to white-sounding names in order to avoid prejudices in the film and
television industries. For example, Martin Sheen, star of the hit
television series The West Wing, changed his name from Ramon
Estevez, later explaining his decision by proclaiming "I know what it
means to have an Hispanic name."7
Moreover, discrimination based on the perceived ethnicity or race
of an applicant due to name is not limited to people of color. Just as a
69. The popular aforementioned 20/20 news program explored issues of proxy
discrimination based on name in a show that aired on September 20, 2004. The
following colloquy took place between Jami Floyd of ABC News and a job recruiter for
Fortune 500 companies in northern California:
JAMI FLOYD (ABC NEWS): If you're looking at two r6sum~s, all
else being equal, one says Shaniqua, one says Jennifer, you're going to call
who first?
JOB RECRUITER (FEMALE): I would call Jennifer first.
JAMI FLOYD (ABC NEWS): It's a choice, she said, she was
trained to make. When representing certain companies, don't send black
candidates. And on a r6sum6, a name may be the only cue of an applicant's
race.
JOB RECRUITER (FEMALE): I think the way that I had been
taught and what has helped me to succeed in the industry is unfair.
JAMI FLOYD (ABC NEWS): And racist.
JOB RECRUITER (FEMALE): Absolutely, yes.
Id.
70. Cf Maxwell, supra note 58, at 19A (arguing that black parents unfairly
burden their children with made-up Afrocentric names).
71. Perea, supra note 13, at 837. Not every name change involves a move
away from racial or ethnic identification. For example, singer-actress Dana Owens has
enjoyed substantial success under her assumed name, Queen Latifah. Based on
Bertrand and Mullainathan's work, one wonders how Queen Latifah's name choice
would have affected her employment possibilities outside of the entertainment world,
and whether even in the entertainment world she would have experienced more
difficulties had she selected an African American-sounding name rather than an African
name. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text, for a discussion regarding the
significance regarding African- versus African American-sounding names.
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black Nyasha may be excluded on the basis of discrimination caused by
racial stereotyping due to her ethnic-sounding name, a white applicant
named Nyasha, who did not in some way identify herself as white on
her r~sum6, could suffer similar discrimination simply because of her
name, which may have incorrectly signaled to hiring decision-makers
that she was black or even the "wrong kind" of White.72
One could argue, however, that employers who make decisions
based upon the sound of a name alone are not acting solely on the basis
of race, but instead may also be drawing inferences about a number of
the applicant's traits. For instance, employers who make a decision
based on an applicant's name could be making a decision based upon
social class. This would certainly seem plausible given the results of
another recent study that claims to measure the effect of having black
racially-identifiable names on teacher expectations and test performance
within elementary education.73 In this study, Professor David Figlio
asserts that teachers and school administrators expect less from children
with "names that are associated more with low socio-economic status,
names that are disproportionately given to black children."74 He then
theorizes that this disparate treatment may partially explain the testing
gap between Blacks and Whites because "names concentrated in the
black community are related to diminished student test performance in
mathematics and reading." 75 He further claimed that, even among
names with a high blackness index, the names with the greatest
correlation to lower socioeconomic status experienced the largest test
gap, even among children who came from the same family. 76
72. One of the author's friends, a white woman named Nyasha, has often
commented on surprised reactions from people when they meet her in person after first
knowing her name.
73. David N. Figlio, Names, Expectations and the Black-White Test Score
Gap 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11195, 2005), available at
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/figlio/blacknames1.pdf. Figlio does not, however, believe that
only Blacks bear the costs of having uncommon names. See Noah Bierman, Students'
Names May Play A Role in Classroom, MIAMI HERALD, June 2, 2005, at lB
(describing another Figlio study that analyzed mostly white subjects and found that
persons with the most uncommon spellings of the name "Caitlin" were likely to
experience "trouble reading when [they] reache[d] third or fourth grade").
74. Figlio, supra note 73, at 3; see also Fryer & Levitt, supra note 59, at 769-
71 (arguing that distinctively black names are associated with lower parental education
and lower per capita income).
75. Figlio, supra note 73, at 14.
76. Id. at 15 (noting that even within the same family, the brother named
Dwayne would be expected to test better than his brother DeMarcus, who would test
better than his brother Da'Quan); see also Christopher Goffard, Ethnlic-Sounding
Names May Hurt Kids: UF Professor Finds Some Cause Subtle Bias, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fort Lauderdale), June 15, 2005, at 1E (describing the Figlio study).
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While the importance of class as a discriminatory tool should not
be minimized, substituting class analysis for discussions of race is
dangerous, especially where poor white workers are not generally
subject to the assumptions related to racial stereotypes that affect poor
Blacks.77 An argument that decision-makers within labor markets can
decouple race and class status also neglects socially constructed
meanings of race and how that construction can employ class as a tool
to infer which "kinds" of Blacks are acceptable in the workplace.
More importantly, as Bertrand and Mullainathan demonstrated in their
study, within the labor market context, it was race (even in its strictly
physical sense), and not class, that was predominantly at work in the
decision of the employers in the study.78 Even when Bertrand and
Mullainathan signaled factors such as class to employers with addresses
in predominantly white and more educated neighborhoods, applicants
79with African American-sounding names yielded no greater returns.
Although applicants who lived in more educated and higher income
neighborhoods had a higher probability of receiving a callback, there
was no evidence that African Americans benefited any more than
Whites from living in such neighborhoods.8 ° Indeed, as Bertrand and
Mullainathan indicated, "if ghettos and bad neighborhoods are
particularly stigmatizing for African Americans, one might have
expected African Americans to be helped more by having a 'good'
address."' s  In sum,, it was the names of the perceived African
American applicants and the ways in which such names signaled
negative social background and characteristics, such as laziness and
incompetence, that resulted in the racial discrimination, and not any
other external factors.82
77. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law.- Race,
Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 829-32 (2003)
(discussing the manner in which class consciousness is "raced").
78. See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 20-21; see also Camille A.
Nelson, Breaking the Camel's Back. A Consideration of Mitigatory Criminal Defenses
and Racism-Related Mental Illness, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 77, 84 (2003)
("[D]iscrimination is not limited to low-income or uneducated Blacks, but is also
reported by Black middle-class professionals.").
79. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 13-14.
80. Id. at 14.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 13-14; see also Discrimination Research Ctr., Names Make a
Difference: The Screening of Resumes by Temporary Employment Agencies in
California 3, 14 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished report), http://drcenter.org/staticdata/pdfs/
nameresume_study.pdf (describing in a study of the effect of names on hiring through
temporary employment agencies in California that, after September 11, Arab
Americans and South Asians received the lowest response rates from temporary
agencies) [hereinafter Names Make a Difference]. Researchers have found that these
1302
2005:1283 By Any Other Name? 1303
For courts to allow discrimination that is based on names that
correlate with blackness, but which does not directly involve an explicit
race-based decision, misses the reality of living as a "raced" person in
the United States.83 It also treats the use of proxies, more generally, as
typically not cognizable within antidiscrimination law. This seems
bizarre given that courts routinely traffic in the most prevalent proxy
for race: color.84 At bottom, studies, such as the one conducted by
Bertrand and Mullainathan, remind us that not all disfavored citizens
and workers are created (un)equal. Society operates on the
racial prejudices based on name, or rather whether a name sounds African American,
begins at an early age. Jack Daniel of the University of Pittsburgh found this in his
study of elementary school students:
JACK DANIEL (UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH): Who is the
smartest, Sarah or Shaniqua?
GRADE SCHOOL STUDENT (MALE): Sarah.
JAMI FLOYD (ABC NEWS): But how far are we from that kind of
change [away from racism in society]? Jack Daniel, vice provost of the
University of Pittsburgh studied four and five-year-old children to find out.
JACK DANIEL (UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH): Who would
you like to play with, Tanisha or Megan?
GRADE SCHOOL STUDENT (MALE): Megan.
JACK DANIEL (UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH): Who took the
bite out of your sandwich? Do you think it was Adam or Jamal?
GRADE SCHOOL STUDENT (MALE): Jamal.
20/20: Can a Name Hold You Back in Job Search?, supra note 68. The answers of
black children were neutral to these questions, but white children "were disturbingly
more likely to associate negative traits with black names." 1d. (quoting Jami Floyd of
ABC News).
83. This use of race as an adjective is meant to signal that courts have failed
to acknowledge that assigning individuals to a specific race, along with its attendant
meanings, is a process. See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling
and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1694 (2000) ("The term
racialization embodies the idea of race as a process. [There are] two aspects of
racialization that are part of racial profiling-the racial category and differences in the
cultural means of subordination."); John A. Powell, A Minority-Majority Nation:
Racing the Population in the Twenty-First Century, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 1415
(2002) ("Historically, those with power have raced society to stratify people based on
color, nationality, and ethnicity."); Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A
Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806-07 (1993) ("I
have suggested in some of my work in critical race theory that 'race' is a verb, that we
are 'raced' through a constellation of practices that construct and control racial
subjectivities. ").
84. See Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J.
1487, 1551-55 (2000).
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understanding that there are bad and good (or not quite as bad) Blacks85
or rather that there are bad Blacks and Blacks who have achieved the
status of "honorary Whites. ,
86
Names then become difference-markers or tools to distinguish
between the acceptable and unacceptable Blacks. The tool could be a
proxy for race and socioeconomic status, social compatibility, or
political agenda. Race, however, is always present in the
consideration. What one's name tells the world about how one
performs his or her race controls the ultimate decision. 7 That decision
has implications for both the culture of the work environment and the
behavior of minority workers.
By distinguishing between name-based discrimination and race
discrimination, courts send a signal to employers as to what values and
forms of regulation are acceptable within the workplace. At some
point, we must ask how the use of proxies as a basis for discrimination
harms the workplace. In the r6sum6 context, giving import to names as
a proxy for identity invites dubious racial consideration into the work
environment by remapping racial constructions onto items that might
85. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 10 (manuscript at 23) ("The way for a Good
Black Man to 'play by the rules' is to 'downplay his racial identity."'); Carbado &
Gulati, supra note 9, at 721 (discussing the hiring of "black people of a certain kind");
see also David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1924, 1924,
1927 (1999) (book review) (analyzing the way in which a black Harvard Law School
graduate, who chose to downplay his racial identity, "worked" his racial identity at his
law firm).
86. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate
Ladder. What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1645,
1658 (2004) ("A person is racially palatable if she is perceived to be peripherally or
unstereotypically nonwhite; she is racially salient if she is perceived to be centrally or
stereotypically nonwhite."); Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials
of 0.1 Simpson and Susan Smith-Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 235,
236 (1996) (discussing how African Americans who are accorded the status of honorary
Whites have a type of racial invisibility).
87. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 86, at 1676-77 (asserting that "firms will
screen for racial palatability and against performative racial difference," and that "firms
will hire people who are phenotypically but unconventionally black-that is to say,
people who 'look' but do not 'act' black"). Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have
written about the work people of color do to counter harmful stereotypes of minority
identities operating in employment environments, see supra note 40, and have also
more generally addressed the notion of race as a "performative identity." Their claim
is that "the social meaning of, for example, a black person's racial identity is a function
of the way in which that person performs (presents) her blackness" such that Blacks can
choose to accept or reject societal expectations of behaving "conventionally" (that is, in
accordance with predominant stereotypes). Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The
Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New
Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1771-72 (2003) (book review).
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otherwise be substantially race-neutral.88 Additionally, Professor
Tristin Green has recently surmised that business practices, such as
appearance codes, result in a discriminatory work environment where
minorities are punished for failing to "fit in." 89 She further theorizes
that courts avoid recognizing the discrimination aspects of the cases by
seeing them through the prism of "business prerogative" rather than
antidiscrimination.9" Strangely, similar to the justification for
appearance codes, businesses could claim that they avoid ethnic names
for business reasons, regardless of an individual's race, because, for
example, their customers or partners do not relate to Lakishas or
Jamals. 91 Our question then is: should employers be permitted to use
this type of justification when such policies endorse the rejection of
persons who are presumed tainted by stereotypical notions of what race
means? We believe Title VII requires the answer to be no. Even
where there are legitimate business reasons, using race in this way
results in at least a mixed-motive discrimination claim. 92  Until some
proper business purpose is advanced, however, such discrimination
violates Title VII because it results in disparate treatment of those
perceived as racial minorities. 93
88. This statement is premised upon the notion that, with the exception of
information like names or group memberships in affinity organizations, one can choose
to be race-neutral on a r~sum6. See Thomas, supra note 83; Gotanda, supra note 83
(discussing race-ing or racialiazation as processes).
89. Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REv.
623, 655-56 (2005).
90. Id. at 658-59.
91. This was the nature of the claim of an employer with regard to his Arab
employee in El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2005). See also
discussion infra notes 186 & 233. As at least one scholar has surmised that even where
these types of business concerns are legitimate, they can serve to reinforce harmful
social norms. ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 23-27 (2001). Using a sex discrimination example where an
employer claimed that hiring women would reduce profits, Professor Post asserts that
we should not imagine Title VII as requiring the destruction of gender norms, but
instead we should "challenge [ourselves] to explore the precise ways in which Title VII
should alter the norms by which sex is given social meaning." Id. at 26.
92. In other words, while we think name avoidance is a type of discrimination
"because of" race, it could also represent mixed-motive discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2(m) (2000) ("[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice."); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (discussing
alleged Title VII mixed-motive discrimination in a case brought by a female warehouse
worker).
93. While not advocating proxy discrimination claims explicitly, Green
appears to agree with this analysis in such cases: "Using disparate treatment theory, for
example we might provide individuals with a legal right to be free from adverse
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Beyond the work environment, there are also consequences to
individual personal choices and behaviors stemming from such
practices. The concept that there are preferred behaviors and statuses
even among generally disfavored groups reinforces the notion of race as
a social construction. It also results in a group of individuals who
cover by intentionally acting in a way that avoids identifiers of the
unacceptable performance of blackness.9 4 According to some scholars,
this type of behavior should be expected.
Clark Freshman, for example, theorizes that "outgroup" members
do not exist within a uniform coalition. 95 Those who are the most
advantaged members of outgroups, like Larry Mungin, a black Harvard
Law School graduate who admitted to playing the role of the good
Black as a survival strategy,96 seek to curry favor with the "ingroup"
by proving they are more similar to the ingroup than they are to less
employment actions taken for a lack of fit with a discriminatory work culture." Green,
supra note 89, at 665-66. Earlier within her article, Green used as an illustration the
story of Keisha Akbar, a black female scientist who wore her hair in braids or natural,
wore clothing featuring African styles, spoke Black English Vernacular to fellow black
employees, and who was not promoted at the small research firm where she worked.
Id. at 646 (discussing Keisha's story, and citing to its original appearance in the work
of another scholar, see Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning A Title VII Remedy for
Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2010-13
(1995)). Under Professor Green's approach, Keisha would be permitted to sue for
discriminatory denial of a promotion based on failure to comply with a discriminatory
work culture.
94. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 714-19; see also Jean Shin, The
Asian American Closet, 11 ASIAN L.J. 1, 1-2 (2004) (exploring covering behavior by
using the metaphor of "the closet" to describe the ways Asian Americans may
downplay ethnic behavior either to appear less "visible" as a move toward whiteness or
merely to hide their foreignness, as they project identities as "model minorities").
Ultimately, this type of "covering" behavior works to the disadvantage of Blacks and
other racial minorities. See generally PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE
STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999) (describing the story of a black Harvard Law
School graduate who worked hard in his career and personal life to be the "good
Black"-to avoid views, objects, and behaviors that could be identified as black). For
example, the irony of the story in The Good Black was that the attorney ultimately filed
a racial discrimination suit against his law firm, alleging that he was denied
consideration for partnership and mistreated in terms of pay and assignments because of
his race. See generally Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (concerning the race discrimination cause of action brought by Mungin). In
other words, even though he aggressively "worked" his identity to avoid being grouped
as just another Black, he was unable to escape racial discrimination.
95. Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social
Science Theories Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different"
Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 329, 427 (2000).
96. See supra note 94.
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advantaged outgroup members." This behavior is detrimental on a
number of levels. First, because it is a move to prove how much one is
like the dominant group, it becomes a new form of "passing,"98 where
one is attempting to mitigate or erase differences through racial identity
performance. 99  This behavior, which can be understood as an
expression of internalized oppression, can be harmful to the individual
engaging in the conduct." Worse still, it results in even minority
97. Cooper, supra note 10 (manuscript at 25-38) (describing how middle class
heterosexual black men are incentivized by the "Good Black Man" image to assimilate
in the form of emulating white men); Freshman, supra note 95, at 435-38; see also
Carbado & Gulati, supra note 86, at 1676 (explaining how the minorities who are most
likely to succeed in corporate environments are the ones "who exhibit the greatest
insider-group affinity"); Kevin R. Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights: The Need
for, and Impediments to, Political Coalitions Among and Within Minority Groups, 63
LA. L. REv. 759, 779-83 (2003) (discussing intra-group conflicts and differences within
minority identity communities that require coalition building to overcome the conflicts
and differences). This attempt by outsiders to hide disfavored identities or identity
traits has also been noted outside of the context of racial identities. See Marc A. Fajer,
A Better Analogy." "Jews, " "Homosexuals, " and the Inclusion of Sexual Orientation as
a Forbidden Characteristic in Antidiscrimination Laws, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 37,
45-47 (2001) (arguing that Jewish people and gays and lesbians engage in identity "self-
censorship" with regard to those traits most commonly associated with their identities
or engage in "politics of safety" to minimize the appearance of those traits that might
emphasize their identities).
98. "Passing refers to an individual's 'decision' to rely upon his or her light
skin and European features in order to assume the life and privilege of a White person
secretly." Tanya Kateri Hernandez, "MultiRacial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in
an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REv. 97, 123 (1998).
Passing is a deception that enables a person to adopt certain roles or
identities from which he would be barred by prevailing social standards in
the absence of his misleading conduct. The classic racial passer in the
United States has been the "white Negro": the individual whose physical
appearance allows him to present himself as "white" but whose "black"
lineage (typically only a very partial black lineage) makes him a Negro
according to dominant racial rules.
Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2001). For examples
and analyses of the behavior within legal academe, see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 223 (1991) (discussing her godmother who was
abandoned by her mother so the mother could pass as a white woman); Harris, supra
note 54, at 1710-14 (discussing her grandmother's passing and the significance of race
as a factor in property rights).
99. Professor Kenji Yoshino defines a similar type of behavior-downplaying
racial identity-as "covering." Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772
(2002).
100. See Kennedy, supra note 98, at 1161-66 (presenting the real and fictional
stories of Blacks who passed for Whites and discussing the psychic and emotional toll
of the behavior); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 50 (manuscript at 19-23) (detailing the
harms of "passing" for those involved in interracial relationships and gay and lesbian
relationships); see also Fajer, supra note 97, at 45-47 (discussing the psychological
harm that befalls gays, lesbians, and Jews who hide or "closet" their identities);
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persons supporting the ends of tokenism.'°' The names studies prove at
once the complexity of how race is constructed by those in power and
performed by those who lack it.
2. VOICE
Much like with names, studies have also revealed a direct link
between discrimination on the basis of race and voice, in particular
between disparate treatment and sounding black or Latino.' 0 2  In the
same way that having an African American-sounding name has been
proven to be a disadvantage to job applicants on the market, having
what is deemed to be a black or a Latino voice has also been proven to
be equally harmful under various circumstances.
In fact, as studies and cases reveal, not only do people believe that
they can correctly identify the race of a person simply by listening to
the individual,' °3 but they also do correctly identify people by race on
Jennifer Swize, Note, Transracial Adoption and the Unblinkable Difference: Racial
Dissimilarity Serving the Interests of Adopted Children, 88 VA. L. REv. 1079, 1115-16
(2002) (discussing the emotional toll of "passing" as biological children, and how it is
less of an issue within the context of transracial adoptions).
101. Since Bertrand and Mullainathan did not report finding differences
between black and white decision-makers, we must conclude that Blacks harbor the
same bias against African American-sounding names. This bias could operate in the
same manner that it works for Whites, where it is the social construction of blackness
that leads to the behavior. The choice that some Blacks make in identity performance
or relying upon "passing" behaviors might, however, provide a different explanation
for the conduct of black employers. Passing carries with it the need to both limit being
discovered and to distance one's self from persons who can challenge one's identity
performance. Kennedy, supra note 98, at 1167-68. Moreover, those who are
attempting to pass may have an interest in "community censoring" or of only letting in
other minorities who behave appropriately. Fajer, supra note 97, at 46-47. Behaviors
such as these lead to the conclusion that some black decision-makers may be acting with
a greater understanding or consciousness about the choice to exclude than white
employers.
102. See infra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
103. See Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 371, 373-76 (Ky. 1999)
(allowing a police officer to testify to the race of the person he heard talking in a room,
but did not see, merely because the voice the police officer heard "sounded as if it was
of a male black"); see also Ferrill v. The Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 471 (1lth
Cir. 1999) (involving a black plaintiff who sued her employer after she was terminated
from a telemarketing firm that conducted "get-out-the-vote" calls, where the firm used
"race-matching"-black employees being directed to speak from a "Black" script for
their calls); Lis Wiehl, "Sounding Black" in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial
Stereotyping, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 185, 201-10 (2002) (arguing that racial
identification on the basis of voice alone is dangerous because it gives legitimacy to the
admission of evidence based on racial prejudice and stereotyping); Jill Gaulding,
Against Common Sense: Why Title VII Should Protect Speakers of Black English, 31
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the basis of voice alone." °4 For example, a study conducted by
Professors John Baugh, William Idsardi, and Thomas Purnell indicated
that the average lay person can accurately identify the race of a person
based on voice more than seventy percent of the time.'0 5 Moreover, as
the three scholars noted, the average lay person can correctly identify
the race of a speaker simply by hearing him or her say one word.° 6 In
fact, studies have shown that, "[n]ot only are [lay persons] quick to
identify, the race of someone speaking Black English Vernacular, but
they are also able to identify the race of code-switching Blacks-those
speaking Standard English but with a 'black' pronunciation of certain
words. "107
More importantly, studies have also shown how negative
attachments are made by listeners when the voice and the race of the
speaker are believed to be or known to be black or Latino.'08 In one
study, separate video footage was made of a white child, an African
American child, and a Latino child, with each child filmed speaking
alone and the same standard English voice dubbed on to all three
videotapes." °9 The subjects of the study were then shown the separate
films and told to score the speech they heard on each film for
standardness and fluency."' When the results of the study were
tabulated, it was revealed that the white child was judged the most
standard and fluent; the African American child was judged fluent, but
not standard; and the Latino child was judged the least fluent."' As
one scholar explained about the effects of stereotyping when one is
believed to be or regarded as black or Latino, "The assessors thought
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 637 (1998) (arguing that black English is such a close
proxy for race that it should be protected under Title VII).
104. SeeWiehl, supranote 103, at 193.
105. Thomas Purnell et al., Perpetual and Phonetic Experiments on American
English Dialect Identification, 18 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 10, 11, 22 (1999)
(describing a study generally measuring the impact of Chicano English, African
American Vernacular English, and Standard American English dialects on access to
rental housing in four San Francisco and Bay Area communities); see also Massey &
Lundy, supra note 13, at 454.
106. Purnell et al., supra note 105, at 28; see also Wiehl, supra note 103, at
194 ("[S]tudies show that a person can identify an African American caller within the
first 5-7 seconds of a phone call.").
107. Massey & Lundy, supra note 13, at 454 (providing one example of lay
persons' ability to identify race based on voice).
108. See Wiehl, supra note 103, at 194 (citing Frederick Williams, Some
Research Notes on Dialect Attitudes and Stereotypes, in LANGUAGE ATTITUDES:
CURRENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 113, 113-28 (Roger Shuy & Ralph W. Fasold eds.,
1973)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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they were reacting to the speech they heard, but in fact they were
reacting to racial stereotypes based on what they had seen.""'
Additionally, Professors Baugh, Idsardi, and Purnell found in four
different experiments that examined the treatment of different fictitious
renters based upon the three dialects-African American Vernacular
English, Chicano English, and Standard American English-and found
that even qualified black and Chicano renters were unlikely to get an
appointment to view an apartment in certain white residential areas.
11 3
In other words, they found that "auditory discrimination arises without
visual contact." 114
Also, Professors Douglas Massey and Garvey Lundy demonstrated
through their study "that landlords do, in fact, discriminate against
prospective tenants on the basis of the sound of their voice during
telephone conversations.... To conduct their study, the professors
used a multiracial group of men and women'16 that included native
speakers of Black English Vernacular ("BEV"), Black Accented
English ("BAE"), and White Middle Class English ("WME"), who
basically spoke from a standard script in their calls to landlords." 7
During this study, the two scholars discovered that people experienced
discrimination based on the intersection of race, sex, and class with
regard to access to a landlord, access to a rental unit, and requests
about their credit histories." 8  For example, Professors Massey and
Lundy determined that the likelihood of even reaching an agent by
having the agent return a call was significantly affected by race,
112. Id.
113. Purnell et al., supra note 105, at 12.
114. Id. While this article limits itself to redressing the use of proxies in the
context of discrimination in access to employment, studies such as this suggest that the
use of proxies should also be further analyzed within the context of housing
discrimination. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 20, at 170 (proposing that Congress amend
the Fair Housing Act to prohibit discrimination based on requirements that are proxies
for protected classes and noting that, although one court had analyzed Section 8
discrimination under a Title VII disparate impact theory, a federal circuit court had
rejected this type of analysis).
115. Massey & Lundy, supra note 13, at 455.
116. The projected image of the renters was of a recent college graduate in his
or her early to midtwenties with an annual income of $25,000-$30,000 and a rent
ceiling of $800 dollars. Id. at 458.
117. Id. at 460-61.
118. Id. at 461-62. "Not only does considerable discrimination occur over the
phone, based purely on a verbal interaction between renters and agents, but
considerable discrimination also occurs with no contact whatsoever, largely through the
use of voice mail and answering machines as racial screening devices." Id. at 467.
BAE is presumed to be spoken by middle-class Blacks. See infra note 122 and
accompanying text.
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gender, and class (as determined by speech)." 9 In particular, female
speakers of BEV, otherwise identified as lower-class black women,
consistently fared the worst. 120 The professors found that eighty-seven
percent of the white male subjects were able to speak with a rental
agent while black-accented males got through only eighty percent of the
time, white middle-class females got through only seventy-five percent
of the time, black-accented females got through only seventy-one
percent of the time, and black vernacular females got through only
sixty-three percent of the time. 121 In addition, they found that,
[w]hereas more than three-quarters of white middle-class
males gained access to a potential rental unit (76%), the
figure dropped to 63% for middle-class black men (those
speaking BAE), 60% for white middle-class females (those
speaking WME), 57% for black middle-class females (those
speaking BAE), 44% for lower-class black men (those
speaking BEV), and just 38% for lower-class black women
(those speaking BEV).'22
Finally, they found that whereas credit history was raised and discussed
as an issue with only three percent of white middle-class males, it was
raised with five percent of white middle-class females, ten percent of
black males regardless of class, twenty-one percent of middle-class
black females, and twenty-three percent of lower-class black females. 12 3
119. Massey & Lundy, supra note 13, at 461-62.
120. Id. at 467.
121. Id. at 460-61, 465 ("At a minimum, therefore, black females can expect
to put in 40% more effort than white males just to reach a rental agent.").
122. Id. at 461 ("In other words, for every call a white male makes to find out
about a rental unit in the Philadelphia housing market, a poor black female must make
two calls to achieve the same level of access, roughly doubling her time and effort
compared with his.").
123. Id. The National Fair Housing Alliance recently uncovered racial
discrimination against black Hurricane Katrina victims, based on the sound of their
voices, at two out of three apartment complexes in seventeen cities including Houston,
Texas; Dallas, Texas; Birmingham, Alabama; and Gainesville, Florida. Thomas
Korosec, Hurricane Aftermath: Survey Finds Bias in Evacuee Housing, Hous. CHRON.,
Dec. 27, 2005, at B. For three months at the end of 2005, the Alliance had callers,
whose voices were clearly those of Whites and Blacks, pose as middle-class Hurricane
Katrina victims who were seeking information on midpriced apartments in various cities
in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas. Id. At sixty-six percent of the
apartment complexes, white callers were treated more favorably than black callers. Id.
The favorable treatment was broad. In some instances, the white callers were quoted
lower rents; in others, black callers were told that no apartments were available just
moments after white callers had been informed of vacancies. Id. Additionally, among
other things, managers frequently lied to black callers about incentives that were put in
place to benefit evacuees, and sometimes waived security deposits for Whites while not
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In sum, much like with name, speech can work to identify individuals
as members of a particular race and thus leave them vulnerable to
discrimination based upon negative stereotypes that are associated with
that racial group.
In some ways, this brand of proxy discrimination is different from
name discrimination. With names, there is an understanding that
employers who reject Blacks with ethnic-sounding names may still be
fine with offering interviews to Blacks with nonblack-sounding
names.1 24  It would seem odd to surmise, although not entirely
inconceivable, that those who are practicing voice discrimination are
merely searching for white-sounding Blacks or Latinos. These property
owners or managers seem to be using their proxy as a method to
eliminate all Blacks and Latinos from the tenant pool, meaning there
are no "good Blacks or Latinos" where these individuals are
concerned.1 25  Voice discrimination, however, is similar to name
discrimination in what it tells us about the complexities of racial
formation and the performativity of identity.1 26 In fact, in the same way
that many people of color have changed their names to avoid
discrimination, both conscious and unconscious, on the basis of their
ethnic-sounding names,121 many people of color have intentionally used
a "'white-sounding' voice, either one's own or a friend's, [as] one
painful strategy ... to get around some discrimination. "128
doing the same for Blacks. Id. The Alliance's President noted, "I was surprised at the
amount of hostility that came out over the telephone when apartment managers could
discern the caller was African American." Id.
124. In many ways, this is an optimistic assumption, supported mainly by the
fact that a substantial number of African Americans are gainfully employed. If,
however, one were committed to a more skeptical position, it could be argued that there
may be very little difference in the receptiveness toward minorities by those who
discriminate on voice versus those who use name, since Blacks who are not eliminated
from consideration based on their names can still be effectively eliminated once their
race is confirmed at an interview.
125. This claim is proven where Blacks and Latinos who sound white and are
invited to view rental units are still denied the ability to rent once their races are
discovered. Purnell et al., supra note 105, at 12-22.
126. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 20; Rich, supra note 9.
127. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
128. Massey & Lundy, supra note 13, at 455 (quoting JOE R. FEAGAN &
MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE 229
(1994)); see also RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE,
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 290 (2003) (describing how his mother would "pass" over
the phone because listeners imagined she was white).
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II. EXPOSING THE FAILURE OF COURTS TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE: THE NEED FOR THE "RIGHT KIND" OF
ANALYSIS
While society has shifted since the passage of Title VII and the
acceptability of openly equating race and color with negative group
characteristics and then applying them to individuals has nearly
dissipated, context-specific judicial analyses of raced-based employment
discrimination claims have deteriorated. While some federal courts
once recognized race as a socially constructed and fluid construct, most
now treat race as a purely physical concept. 129
This understanding of race and racial discrimination is
problematic. First, in a world where multiculturalism and claims to
biracial or multiracial identities are increasing, such a rule gives
employers greater power to hide discriminatory treatment in the
workplace. 3 ' Second, this conception hardly leaves any room for
analyzing discrimination based upon socially constructed definitions of
race, including distinctions that are made between jobs that an employer
deems appropriate for certain racial groups and distinctions that are
made between members of the same racial group, 3' for example,
129. See Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 (1992) ("Discrimination stems from a reliance on
immaterial outward appearances that stereotype an individual with imagined, usually
undesirable, characteristics thought to be common to members of the group that shares
these superficial traits. It results in a stubborn refusal to judge a person on his merits
as a human being."); see also Rich, supra note 9, at 1141-42 (describing how
discrimination against race-ethnicity performance should also constitute race-based
discrimination because, in such cases, "the employer sanctions the employee because of
a fear of racial or ethnic presence: The employee's appearance reminds the employer of
the employee's minority status and her potential to disrupt the current cultural
hegemony of the workplace."). Of course, in 1964 when Title VII was enacted, it was
not necessary to explicitly discuss the ways in which race was socially constructed
because it was clear at the time that, in the eyes of much of white society, no black
people were acceptable.
130. As Professor Trina Jones argues, where employees inhabit multiracial
identities, it gives employers an opportunity to choose which "race" they used to
classify a plaintiff in a discrimination suit. Jones, supra note 84, at 1552. For
example, if a black person is hired or promoted over a person of black and white
heritage, the employer could claim they regarded the plaintiff as black. See id. If a
white or multiracial person were hired or promoted, the employer could similarly claim
in each case that he believed the disfavored employee belonged to the racial group of
the selected or preferred employee. See id. at 1551-53.
131. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd,
U.S. v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1182 (1995). The
court observed:
As more well-educated blacks flowed into America's mainstream, whites
even began to differentiate between the kind of blacks who reflected white
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concepts of good versus bad African Americans. 3  For instance,
federal courts' application of the "same actor inference," which
contends that a decision-maker who fired or did not promote the
plaintiff is presumed not to have acted on racial prejudice because of
the earlier decision to hire the plaintiff in the first place, 133 neglects the
fact that a decision-maker may view some members of a racial group as
more preferable than others,13 1 or a particular entry level job as
appropriate for members of a certain racial group but consider a higher
level position in the company as being too good for members of that
racial group. 131
Likewise, cases in which the courts have determined that the hiring
or promotion of a person in the plaintiff's same racial group precludes a
finding of discrimination disregard the fact that the decision not to hire
or promote the plaintiff may have been based on stereotypical
conceptions of blackness-of views that the plaintiff was not the "right
kind" of Black.136 The negative power of such stereotypes is evident
values and who were not like "those other" blacks akin to the inner city
stereotype.
A benign neglect for the harmful impact or fallout upon the black
community that might ensue from decisions made by the white community
for the "greater good" of society has replaced intentional discrimination.
[W]hites have become indignant at the suggestion that they harbor any ill-
will towards blacks or retain any vestiges of racism. After all, they have
black friends. They work with black people every day. They enjoy black
entertainers on their favorite television programs every night.
Id. at 779 (emphasis added); see also Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d
928, 931 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1071 (1994) (explaining that under
Title VII, a fired black employee had to show that, despite his own lacking
performance, the employer demonstrated more favorable treatment to nonblack
employees with similarly lacking performance).
132. See, e.g., BARRETT, supra note 94 (describing the story of a black
Harvard Law School graduate who "covered" in certain ways, including his dress, to
distinguish himself from other African Americans as a "good Black"); Yoshino, supra
note 99, at 879-87 (discussing the ways in which Larry Mungin "covered" or
downplayed his race to put Whites at ease).
133. Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1995);
Choate v. Transp. Logistics Corp., 234 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (D. Conn. 2002).
134. See Crawford v. Hospitality Enters., Inc., 2002 WL 1905883 at *2
(E.D. La, Aug. 16, 2002) (denying a defendant's motion for summary judgment in a
case involving a challenge to a supervisor's discriminatory hiring practices, where the
supervisor specifically discriminated against "blacks with gold teeth, blacks with
braids, and blacks with jerry curls or greasy hair").
135. See Paetzold & Gely, supra note 37, at 1520, 1524.
136. See Davis v. Boykin Mgmt. Co., No. 91-CV-359E(M), 1994 WL 714517
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1994). According to the court,
[A]s a matter of common sense and experience, that an employer would
dismiss a black employee and replace him or her with another black hardly
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even where Blacks have acquired elite educations and positions within
the workplace. These embedded notions about the constraints of
blackness appear to produce alternate permutations of the "right kind"
of Black phenomenon. For example, in his book about frustrated black
executives, Ellis Cose found that many black executives claimed that
companies steered them into dead-end "black" jobs, which involved
working in such areas as "community relations" or "minority
affairs." 137  This phenomenon suggests that employers see even the
highly qualified Blacks they hire as only suitable for the "right kind" of
positions.'38 A different version of companies investing in "black slots"
is given effect through what Professor Stephen Carter describes as the
"best black" syndrome. 139  The syndrome essentially sets up a false
choice between diversity and quality.14° Those who practice this tactic
will hire a black applicant because he or she is perceived to be the best
establishes (although it may be evidence of) an absence of discrimination.
For example, an employer might tolerate outspokenness in his white
employees but find objectionable a comparable lack of reserve by a black
employee because of a feeling that blacks should "know their place." If his
solution is to fire the outspoken black in favor of a more docile or reserved
black employee, his action obviously still is discriminatory even though the
position was not filled by a "non-protected class member." Other
conceivable employers might have a particular animus toward very dark-
complexioned black employees and thus replace them with light-
complexioned blacks. Again, discrimination is obvious even though the
new hires are black.
Id. at *4. Additionally, even Blacks have expectations of what it means to be the "right
kind" of black employee. One recent Title VII case dealt with a complaint that arose
from a black employee who was not perceived as authentically black, or the "right
kind" of Black, by her black supervisor. Bryant v. Begin Manage Program, 281 F.
Supp. 2d 561 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying summary judgment in a case where a black
woman claimed she was replaced in her job after her black supervisor asked the
employee to dress in a more "Afrocentric" style, criticized the employee's dyed-blonde
hair, and referred to the employee as a "wannabe"); cf O'Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996) (explaining how the Fourth Circuit's analysis of
discrimination under the ADEA, which required that the person who replaced the
plaintiff be under forty years old, created a safe harbor in which employers could
discriminate).
137. ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 80-82 (1993).
138. This phenomenon may work in the reverse as well. For example, in a
study of the use of names as a screening device for temporary employment agencies in
California, researchers concluded that "White-sounding names may [have] cue[d]
positive stereotypes, especially regarding white male applicants, and result[ed] in
fewer, not greater, job opportunities" because white men were viewed as "'too good'
or 'not appropriate' for the [temporary] administrative office positions." Names Make
a Difference, supra note 82, at 17.
139. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY
49 (1991).
140. See id. at 51.
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black applicant, rather than the best applicant irrespective of race. 4 '
While the practice might be said to be the practical consequence of
affirmative action, it is actually grounded upon stereotypes that suggest
that the best Blacks cannot compete with the best Whites in the
workforce.'42 Such a practice serves the ends of tokenism by ensuring
that the best Black-he or she being the finest the race has to offer-
will also be the only Black. 4 3  Taken together, these practices
demonstrate how employers searching for the right kind of black person
for the "right kind of black position," may then limit their hiring of
Blacks to a very discrete set of individuals, whose promotion prospects
will be limited.14
4
In other words, analyses in these cases and of employer treatment
of minority employees reveal a snapshot of a work world where
employers fail to account for policies and actions that may limit
opportunities for racial minorities, or exclude certain types of racial
minorities altogether. Certainly, very little attention is paid to
discrimination in the workplace for minorities who are considered to be
the wrong kind of person of color or are viewed as simply too "ethnic."
Part of the problem appears to be that courts rarely encounter claims
where plaintiffs specifically charge that they are being punished for
being the wrong type of person of color. Interestingly, in one such
case involving intraracial discrimination based on skin color, Sanders v.
District of Columbia, the court accepted as viable under Title VII a
black plaintiffs claim that "her light-skinned black supervisors gave
preferential treatment to other light-skinned black employees, at the
expense of [the plaintiff], who [was] dark-skinned."'45  Although the
court recognized Ms. Sanders' claim as viable under Title VII, the
court's decision reveals that claims of intraracial discrimination are
difficult to prove. In dismissing Ms. Sanders' claim the court
explained that she "adduced no credible evidence to substantiate [her
141. Id.
142. See id. at 50.
143. See id. at 50-52.
144. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 86, at 1672-73, 1675-76.
145. No. 88-3614 SS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7448, at *2-3 (D.D.C. June 4,
1991). The court based this decision on discussions of Title VII contained in the
Congressional Record and the ruling of another federal court, which previously held
that discrimination based on shades of skin color was actionable under Title VII. Id. at
*7 n.1; see also Saint Francis Coll. v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) ("[A]
distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981 protection."); Bland v.
New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d 526, 547 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (reporting allegations made in
a Title VII sexual harassment complaint, that the plaintiffs supervisor, an African
American judge, made derogatory comments about dark-skinned African American
women). The Title VII claim was dismissed as the plaintiff was found not to be an
"employee" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 557.
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claim], other than the lone fact that both [the supervisor] and
the . . . [colleague] who was permitted to keep her position ha[d]
lighter skin than Ms. Sanders."146 The court further pointed out that
Ms. Sanders could provide no evidence of "a single conversation,
comment, or deed showing either directly or indirectly that [the
supervisor] or any other . . . official was inclined to, or ever did,
discriminate against dark-skinned black individuals."147
But given that people are rarely overtly discriminatory, is it likely
such evidence would exist? Would the court have accepted Ms.
Sanders' arguments had she also presented expert evidence about
discrimination against dark-skinned Blacks, along with evidence that
her supervisor and her replacement were both light-skinned? Or,
returning to the findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan's study that are
central to this Article, would a black Jamal Jackson, unlike Ms.
Sanders, be able to convince a court that racial discrimination prevented
his being hired for a job, where his sole evidence would be that the
only Blacks hired by the employer had nonethnic-sounding names?
Given how the courts have constructed the operation of race and
identity in previous cases, would the presentation of such evidence
really be more supportive of a prima facie case?
The question becomes then: whether a court can really make a
determination about the import of color or intrarace status distinctions
without first complicating its understanding of race and identity. For
instance, in the Sanders case, one could argue that a more robust
analysis would require the court to situate the plaintiff's claims within
the context of social science or normative evidence pertaining to the
privileges that accompany whiteness and lightness. 48
146. Sanders, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7448, at *7.
147. Id. at *8.
148. See cases cited supra note 145; see also KATHY RUSSELL ET AL., THE
COLOR COMPLEX: THE POLITICS OF SKIN COLOR AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS 124-34
(1992) (discussing how within and outside the workplace context, black people
discriminate in favor of Blacks with lighter skin); Ronald Turner, The Color Complex:
Intraracial Discrimination in the Workplace, 46 LAB. L.J. 678 (1995) (discussing
intraracial workplace discrimination among Blacks); Harris, supra note 54, at 1724-45
(discussing the property-like qualities of whiteness or lightness); see also STEPHANIE M.
WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES
AMERICA 1-24 (1996) (identifying whiteness as one of the societal sources of systemic
privilege); Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does
Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and
Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENy. U. L. REV. 131, 157-84 (1997) (examining
the hypothesis that lighter-skinned people of color experience less discrimination than
those who are darker-skinned); Hernandez, supra note 98, at 118 (describing the value
of whiteness to multiracial individuals as "an intrinsic part of an institutional racial
hierarchy in which the closer one can approximate whiteness, the better off one is
economically and socially").
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Unlike the Sanders case, the more prevalent cases involving
intrarace distinctions typically involve courts deciding the import of an
employer's ostensibly race- or color-neutral decisions, which serve to
disadvantage certain persons of color. For example, in Rogers v.
American Airlines, Inc., a district court completely disregarded the
possibility that the employer's policy banning all braided hairstyles was
the result of an attempt to exclude not all Blacks, 49 but the kind of
Black who is negatively stereotyped based on their wearing cornrow
braids-in other words, one who is too "ethnic." Again, the court
failed to recognize the ways in which the policy may have been
premised upon a more complex behavioral response to racial
difference-in this case, the improper reliance upon racial stereotyping
as determined by a proxy for race such as hairstyle. 5 ° Relying solely
on the concept of physical race, the court dismissed the discrimination
claim of the plaintiff, which was based on a work policy that prohibited
all braided hairstyles.' 5' In so doing, the court held that unlike skin
color, "[a]n all-braided hairstyle is an 'easily changed characteristic,'
and, even if socioculturally associated with a particular race or
nationality, is not an impermissible basis for distinctions in the
149. 527 F. Supp. 229, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The same conclusion was
reached in a similar suit brought against American Airlines seventeen years later.
Cooper v. American Airlines, No. 97-1901, 1998 WL 276235 (4th Cir. May 26, 1998)
(affirming the dismissal of an African American woman's Title VII claim that alleged
intentional and disparate impact discrimination based upon race, where she was
reprimanded for wearing braids in violation of the company's revised grooming policy);
see also infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text (discussing McBride v. Lawstaf,
Inc., No. 1:96-CV-0196-CC, 1996 WL 755779 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996). For a
more recent case involving an African-American challenging an ostensibly race-neutral
grooming policy, see Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2003). The policy
actually allowed braids, but not the dreadlocks the petitioner wore. Id. at 379. The
complaint essentially alleged that the petitioner was being singled out for discrimination
because, as one who practiced the Rastafarian religion, which necessitated the
dreadlocks, he was the wrong kind of black person. Id. Unlike the Rogers plaintiff,
Booth's racial discrimination claims were not brought under Title VII, but under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983. Id. The Appellate court affirmed the dismissal of his section
1981 claim, even where Booth alleged that grooming standards were not enforced
against Whites and some other black employees. Id. at 383-84. Interestingly, the
lower court's dismissal of the section 1983 claim was reversed and remanded because
the lower court had erroneously held that Booth was required to file this intentional
discrimination claim under Title VII. Id. at 382-83.
150. One "braids" case does seem to make this connection to how the policy is
actually being used by the employer. See Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 660-
61 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding a Title VII disparate treatment claim was sustainable where
an unwritten, race-neutral hairstyle policy was differentially applied to a black female
employee).
151. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231-32.
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application of employment practices by an employer. , 152 Additionally,
the court reasoned that the policy was not racially discriminatory
because it applied equally to both Blacks and Whites. 5 3  Such
reasoning, however, neglects an even more important point about how
race is socially constructed-in particular, the idea that the policy that
prohibited all braided hairstyles may not have only been a means of
excluding the "wrong kind" of Black but the "wrong kind" of White,
meaning a white person who would dare wear a "black" hairstyle such
as cornrows. 1
54
As Rogers and the other "braids" cases suggest, federal courts
have consistently rejected claims filed by individual plaintiffs who have
alleged discrimination based on proxies for an impermissible trait
covered by antidiscrimination legislation, thereby neglecting the fact
that disfavored status is not merely about the physical but about how the
social identity of any particular group has been constructed.15 5 Indeed,
both prior to and since the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,156 which involved an allegation of age
discrimination based on the use of pensions as a proxy for age, 157 courts
have generally been resistant to using Title VII as a means of
remedying discrimination by proxy.' 58 In Hazen Paper, the plaintiff,
Walter Biggins, filed a lawsuit under the ADEA, alleging that his age
motivated his employer's decision to terminate him.'59 Specifically,
Biggins claimed that his employer fired him just weeks before his
pension vested because the employer wanted to avoid any costs
associated with his pension. 16  In reviewing the case, the Supreme
152. Id. at 232.
153. See id.
154. Recently, a white teenage girl was sent home from school for wearing her
hair in cornrows. The headteacher asserted that her hair was "too extreme." Deborah
Haile, School Bans "Wrong Race" Hairstyle, Mar. 17, 2005,
http://www.manchesteronline.co.uk/news/education/s/151/151512_schoolbans-wrong
-race hairstyle.html. A school official explained, "We don't allow any extreme
hairstyles of any description at the school. We are a high-achieving school with high
standards and we don't allow any street culture into school." Id. Although this
example occurred in the United Kingdom, this example of punishment for a white
teenager who wore her hair in cornrows demonstrates how in society even Whites are
expected to perform their racial identity in a way that distances them from blackness.
155. Cf Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 717 ("The social meaning of being
a black woman is not monolithic and static but contextual and dynamic.").
156. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
157. Id. at 606-07.
158. See infra notes 164-86 and accompanying text.
159. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 606.
160. Id. at 607. In support of his claim, Biggins highlighted the fact that his
employer offered to retain him as a consultant, a capacity in which he would not have
been entitled to receive pension benefits. Id.
2005:1283 1319
1320 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Court held that discharging an older employee to prevent his pension
benefits from vesting did not violate the ADEA where the vesting of the
pension benefits was based on years of service, a factor that merely
correlated with age.'6 1 According to the Court, the ADEA was not
enacted to address decisions made by employers that were related to but
not necessarily based on age; instead, it was targeted at employment
decisions that were based upon stereotypes of older workers as
unproductive and incompetent. 
162
The effects of Hazen Paper on cases concerning discrimination
based on proxies, even those concerning race discrimination, have been
damaging despite the fact that the Supreme Court itself explained that
its decision should not preclude liability where an employer directly
uses pension status as a proxy for age. 163  In numerous age
discrimination cases, federal courts have rejected plaintiffs' proxy
discrimination claims on the ground that the challenged employment
decision was not based on misperceptions about the competence of
older workers, but instead on factors not covered by law. 164  Such
161. Id. at 608-09, 611. For a discussion of the complications arising from the
Court's handling of age-correlated factors, or the "age proxy doctrine," see Toni J.
Querry, Note, A Rose By Any Other Name No Longer Smells As Sweet: Disparate
Treatment Discrimination and the Age Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 81 CORNELL L. Rv. 530 (1996). While asserting that employers should be
able to act based upon some factors that correlate with age, the Note argues that
correlations that appear to defeat the congressional purpose of the ADEA-preventing
employers from "acting on inaccurate stereotypes about older workers' abilities and
productivity and discriminating . 'because of [their] age'-"-must be prohibited. Id.
at 566 (footnote omitted).
162 Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 610-11. The Court recently reaffirmed its
belief that the general purpose of the ADEA was to protect older persons from being
discriminated against on the basis of age. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline,
540 U.S. 581, 586 (2004). We recognize that there are distinctions between these age
discrimination cases and cases involving the use of an outside factor as a proxy for
race; nonetheless, we find the comparison to be useful.
163. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 612-13 ("We do not preclude the
possibility that an employer who targets employees with a particular pension status on
the assumption that these employees are likely to be older thereby engages in age
discrimination. "); see also Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life in That Old (I Mean, More
"Senior") Dog Yet. The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 391, 392 (1994) (asserting that the Supreme Court "did not
foreclose the use of the proxy theory in all cases" after Hazen Papej).
164. See Gen. Dynamics Sys., 540 U.S. at 592. But see EEOC v. Ceres
Terminals, Inc., No. 99C5320, 2001 WL 109811, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2001)
(distinguishing the plaintiffs' lawsuit from Hazen Paper where the employees' "receipt
of pension plan disbursements was directly correlated with age"); see also Huff v.
UARCO, Inc., 122 F.3d 374, 388 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming a denial for a motion for
summary judgment where the pension plan was triggered by "a hybrid of age and years
of service"); Kiser v. Naperville Cmty. Unit, 227 F. Supp. 2d 954, 963-64 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (same).
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decisions by courts ignore a number of important concerns about the
dangers of discrimination based on proxies, including the fact that even
decisions made on correct perceptions about older workers may be
motivated by reasons that contravene the purposes of antidiscrimination
legislation. 165
Moreover, such a limited analysis of discrimination has essentially
left a gaping hole in which employers may avoid liability for their
potentially discriminatory decisions and has extended into lawsuits
concerning race and national origin discrimination. For example, in
some instances, employers have relied on the proxy of voice or accent
as a means of excluding applicants from jobs. 166  Although accent is
intrinsically intertwined with national origin, courts have consistently
held that accent may serve as a legitimate reason for not hiring an
individual if it can be shown to interfere with job performance. 67
165. For example, as Professor Michael Zimmer has explained, the Supreme
Court failed to acknowledge that "the employer [in Hazen Papej might not have
discharged Biggins to prevent his pension from vesting if he had been much younger
because receipt of any pension benefits would have been so much further off."
Zimmer, supra note 31, at 1901. Likewise, some courts have rejected claims under the
ADEA where the decision to fire older employers was partially based on the fact that
older workers tend to have more experience and thus cost more in terms of salaries and
benefits (a rather reliable perception of older workers). See Criley v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997). According to these courts, even though older
workers may specifically be targeted by the employer's actions, such decisions are not
the result of animus or misperceptions due to age, but rather the result of applying a
neutral factor that has some correlation to age. 1d. For example, in Criley, the Second
Circuit affirmed a district court's decision to grant summary judgment on the plaintiffs'
claims under the ADEA where there was evidence to "support an inference that Delta
was reluctant to hire pilots who would shortly be disqualified from piloting and might
begin drawing pension benefits" because "an employer's concern about economic
consequences of employment decisions does not constitute age discrimination ... even
though there may be a correlation with age." 1d.
166. See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination
Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1348-57
(1991) (analyzing Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989) and
other incidents where speakers of Hawaiian Creole, Korean, and other languages were
discriminated against in employment and other contexts based upon accents); Dawn L.
Smalls, Linguistic Profiling and the Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 579, 580-82
(2004) (discussing the negative effects within employment contexts of linguistic and
ethnic minorities having "non-standard dialects").
167. See, e.g., Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596-97 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1081 (1990) (asserting that the city clerk must be able to communicate effectively
with the public where the clerk would be responsible for handling hundreds of daily
inquiries); Hou v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 573 F. Supp 1539 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (concluding
that a professor's accent materially affected his performance in his job where there
were student complaints regarding difficulty in understanding him). But see Odima v.
Westin Tucson Hotel Co., 991 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that accent was an
improper basis for an employment decision where the plaintiff testified for several
hours at trial and the court understood him).
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Additionally, although language and national origin are often
intertwined, courts have held that employers may discharge employees
for speaking languages other than English in the workplace even if it
does not affect their job performance. 68 In essence, while there are
certainly instances in which accent or speaking a different language
may clearly hinder performance on a job, courts have created a space in
which employers may be able to hide any prejudices they may have
toward certain ethnic groups by invoking an English-only rule or
communication-skills requirement, even when such factors may be
helpful but not necessary to effective performance on the job. 169
Indeed, such race- and ethnicity-based motives on behalf of
employers, even if unconscious, can be inferred from the fact that such
issues tend to arise only when employers are dealing with the accents of
and languages spoken by people who speak Spanish and rarely against
those with British or other European accents. 70 For example, in Garcia
v. Gloor,171 the Fifth Circuit upheld an employer's ban on Spanish-
speaking in the workplace where Spanish-speaking sales employees
were actually expected to speak Spanish to Spanish-speaking customers,
who made up seventy-five percent of the employer's customer base.
Noting that the plaintiff "was hired by [the employer] precisely because
he was bilingual,' ' 72 the Fifth Circuit held that the employer had not
discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of national origin
because Title VII "does not prohibit all arbitrary employment
practices" 73 and because "English-speaking customers [had] objected to
communications between employees that they could not understand; " 74
a feeling that several scholars have explained can be attributed to
prejudices against Latinos and perceptions of Latinos as perpetual
168. See Perea, supra note 13, at 808 & n. 15.
169. See Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596. The court observed that,
Accent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined in many
cases. It would therefore be an easy refuge in this context for an employer
unlawfully discriminating against someone based on national origin to state
falsely that it was not the person's national origin that caused the
employment or promotion problem, but the candidate's inability to measure
up to the communications skills demanded by the job.
Id.; see also Matsuda, supra note 166, at 1350-57 (claiming that courts are too willing
to accept explanations for accent discrimination that are rooted in prejudice without
questioning whether an accent renders the speaker nonfunctional for a particular job).
170. Cf Johnson & Martfnez, supra note 20, at 1251-52, 1268-70.
171. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
172. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 267.
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foreigners.' In essence, although restrictions or decisions based on
accent and language not only correlate highly with national origin, but
also for many employers, signal national origin or, more importantly,
carry with them negative social meanings based on race and ethnicity,
federal courts do not generally recognize claims challenging language
and accent restrictions under Title VII. As explained by the court in
Garcia, "neither the statute nor common understanding equates national
origin with the language that one chooses to speak."176
Additionally, courts have indicated that they would reject similar
proxy discrimination claims filed by applicants to a temporary
employment agency if they alleged that they were discriminated against
because of race where hairstyle was used as a proxy for blackness.177
For example, in McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., the plaintiff, Corrine
McBride, filed a lawsuit alleging that her employer terminated her in
retaliation for challenging what she considered to be the agency's
discriminatory policy of not referring qualified applicants with braided
hairstyles for employment positions. 18  McBride believed that the
agency's policy was simply a means of excluding Blacks from work
through the agency,179 or as some scholars would clarify, of precluding
a particular type of Black from participation.18 ° Soon after McBride
threatened to complain about the agency's grooming policy to the Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC), she was fired by her
employer for unprofessional conduct.' In reviewing a motion to
dismiss McBride's claim of retaliation under Title VII, the district court
175. See generally Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins
Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving
English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal
Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1347 (1997) (discussing discrimination against Latinos
in the context of bilingualism and English-only rules); Steven W. Bender, Direct
Democracy and Distrust The Relationship Between Language Law Rhetoric and the
Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 145, 157 (1997)
(discussing how the English-only movement is "fueled by prejudice against and fear of
Latinos/as").
176. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 268.
177. McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-CV-0196-CC, 1996 WL 755779
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996); see also supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text
(discussing the Rogers, Cooper and Booth discrimination claims, which were also
premised upon hairstyle); Caldwell, supra note 20, at 366 (discussing the Rogers case
and describing discrimination of this type as "widespread and longstanding").
178. McBride, 1996 WL 755779, at *1.
179. See id.
180. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 723 ("[Slhould the firm not hire
[Toney], it will not be because Toney is black in a phenotypic sense .... Instead, the
decision will be based on the kind of black person the firm perceives Toney to be-that
is, the individualized social meaning of Toney's black identity.").
181. McBride, 1996 WL 755779, at *1.
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granted the motion on the ground that McBride's retaliation claim was
viable only if she complained about an unlawful employment
practice. 182 It then held that an employer's refusal to place applicants
with braided hairstyles into jobs did not constitute an unlawful
employment practice. 83  In other words, much like the situation in
Hazen Paper,'84 the court held that, while there may be a correlation
between ethnic hairstyle and race or national origin, such styles were
not tantamount to race and thus were not an unlawful basis for making
hiring or other employment decisions.185
Overall, the treatment of proxy discrimination cases in federal
courts falls in line with the failure of courts to evaluate race
discrimination cases in a manner that recognizes the complexities of
racism and race discrimination.' 86 Indeed, the courts' treatment of such
cases often fails to acknowledge that race discrimination against an
individual may involve unfair or differential treatment based upon a
mere perception of a person's race-in other words, disparate treatment
based upon racial stereotyping due to a trait, factor, or quality that is
considered to belong to persons of a particular race.187 In sum, current
interpretations of race-based antidiscrimination employment laws depart
from an understanding of race that acknowledges the social meanings of
182. Id. at *1-3.
183. Id. at *2.
184. See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
185. See McBride, 1996 WL 755779, at *2.
186. See Houh, supra note 14, at 464 ("[A]ntidiscrimination laws have reified
marginalization, powerlessness, and/or cultural imperialism by failing to address in any
substantive way 'the social process by which the results of work and work itself are
appropriated."'); see also Aaron Celious & Daphna Oyserman, Race from the Inside:
An Emerging Heterogeneous Race Model, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 149, 149 (2001) (quoting
LAWRENCE 0. GRAHAM, OUR KIND OF PEOPLE 5 (2000), which claimed that persons
working with racial identity theories "typically handle race as a simple Black-White
dichotomy that overlooks within-group heterogeneity, substituting a subgroup-young,
low socioeconomic status, darker skinned men-for all African Americans"). But see
El-Hakem v. BJY, Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding valid a claim
under federal antidiscrimination law based upon an employer's insistence on modifying
an employee's ethnic-sounding name); supra note 19 (discussing the Orhorhaghe and
Piliod immigration discrimination cases in which courts recognized that names were
improperly being used as proxies for national origin).
187. See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, in
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 62-65
(Robert Post ed., 2001) (noting that the dominant society ascribes traits and behaviors
to certain groups, generally assumes all group members have the assigned
characteristics, then acts with false beliefs leading to societal discrimination against
group members).
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race, in particular what blackness or other markers for racial or ethnic
identity signify on the job market and in society. 18 8
III. WHY TITLE VII SHOULD APPLY EVEN IF LAKISHA AND JAMAL
ARE WHITE: IMPORTING THE "REGARDED As" PRONG OF THE ADA
INTO TITLE VII CASE ANALYSIS189
As this Article demonstrates, individuals are not only
discriminated against on the job market because of animus toward their
racial group as defined by phenotype, but also because they are
perceived, whether consciously or unconsciously, as belonging to a
particular racial group and as having the negative qualities linked to
stereotypes of that group. For instance, an individual, whether or not
he or she actually is black, may be discriminated against because he or
she is perceived to be or "regarded as" black (that is, what it socially
means to be black) based upon a proxy for blackness.190
188. See Jones, supra note 84, at 1494-95 ("In the United States, being White
generally means that one has access to the psychological and economic privileges of
Whiteness. Being Black generally means that one is pegged lower in the socioeconomic
hierarchy. ").
189. Two scholars once posed the following provocative questions:
Should women or African-Americans claim they are victims of
discrimination on the basis of disability-because they are regarded as
being physically or mentally impaired in the performance of major life
activities-rather than on the basis of race or sex? At first, the question
seems insulting, suggesting as it does, that there is something aberrant or
defective about not being male or white. Or perhaps the question is
merely pointless: if federal civil rights laws broadly prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, age, and
disability-and they do-then what difference does it make how we
categorize forbidden conduct?
Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1996). While the article goes on to treat the
questions as largely rhetorical, and instead focuses on similarities and differences
between the ADA and preexisting antidiscrimination statutes, it introduces the
beginnings of an idea that we explicitly and substantively explore in this Part of our
Article.
190. It is not our intent to place too much emphasis on the admittedly rare
instances where non-Blacks with African American-sounding names will become the
victims of discrimination. We understand that it is African Americans who bear the
greatest burden of this type of discrimination based upon having black-sounding names.
Our goal is to illuminate the power and prevalence of the negative construction of race
that the name is a proxy for. This skewed understanding of race and how individuals
learn to discriminate based upon it is so powerful that it prevents employers from
seeing that they are also eliminating potentially acceptable nonblack candidates. The
alternate and equally devastating conclusion is that the race bias is so strong that
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Even though this article proposes a methodology for dealing
with the innovation of proxy discrimination, it is arguable that there is
nothing in Title VII that would prevent courts from regulating this type
of conduct as traditional disparate treatment discrimination. The basic
differences between proxy discrimination and more typical forms of
discrimination under Title VII have to do with the methods of
discrimination and the cognitive processes or steps involved. Whereas
traditionally, intentional forms of race discrimination have involved
face-to-face encounters, which confirm through physical characteristics
the victim's membership in the protected class to which negative social
stereotypes are attached, proxy discrimination operates without the
requirement of any such interaction or confirmation. Instead, proxy
discrimination involves the use of some other marker as an indicator of
physical characteristics or group membership, to which negative
stereotypes have been attached prior to the discriminatory act. It is not
outlandish to suggest that, even with these differences in the operation
of the conduct, proxy discrimination simply is race-based
discrimination.' 9 ' The problem, however, arises in convincing federal
courts of this fact; courts hearing antidiscrimination claims have been
reluctant to regulate behaviors premised upon traits that highly correlate
with, but do not necessarily implicate, protected categories.
Given the trend in Title VII case law, a black plaintiff with an
African American-sounding name who sent a r6sum6 to a prospective
employer could not state a claim for race discrimination even if she
could show that an applicant with a similar r6sum6 but a white-
sounding name received a callback and she did not. The black
plaintiff's claim would likely fail in federal courts on the ground that
the two factors, name and race, while highly correlated, are not
equivalent. Likewise, if a white plaintiff filed a claim asserting that she
was not given a callback because "she sounded too black," '192 her claim
would likely fail even if the employer admitted that the sound of the
applicant's voice was the reason for the decision. The reasoning would
be that discriminating against someone because they "sound black" is
not discrimination on the basis of an impermissible trait and therefore is
not covered by Title VII.
employers intend to discriminate against non-Blacks with African American-sounding
names, because the name is enough to taint such applicants with the social stigma of
blackness.
191. Or, using the language of Title VII, proxy discrimination is discrimination
"because of [an] individual's race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
192. See Wiehl, supra note 103, at 194 (identifying a study that showed that a
white male, who "had adopted the style and speech associated with African
Americans," was incorrectly identified as black ninety-two percent of the time).
1326
2005:1283 By Any Other Name? 1327
Such rulings by federal courts, however, would be misguided
because they would essentially eviscerate one of the purposes of Title
VII-to combat decisions based upon negative stereotypes associated
with particular racial groups. 193 They would fail to acknowledge the
fact that discrimination based upon race actually encompasses
discrimination based upon social meanings of race-that is, what it
means to be perceived as black, whether one is or is not actually
black. 194 Moreover, these holdings by courts would actually fly in the
face of the Supreme Court's actual words in Hazen Paper, where the
Court specifically noted that it did not intend to "preclude the
possibility that an employer who targets employees with a particular
[feature] on the assumption that these employees are likely to [belong to
a certain group] thereby engages in ... discrimination. "'195 As the
Supreme Court explained in Hazen Paper, an employer may have
discriminated against an individual where the employer has "suppose[d]
a correlation between two factors and act[ed] accordingly. " 196
If nothing else, Hazen Paper and the purposes of Title VII indicate
that claims brought by an individual who has experienced
discrimination because he or she was "regarded as" belonging to a
certain race should fall under the protection of Title VII.' 97 The
193. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988)
(discussing an employer's reliance on "subconscious stereotypes and prejudices" related
to race and describing the conduct as the type of harm "that Title VII was enacted to
combat"). As Professor Samuel Bagenstos has surmised, "[1It should be clear that the
goals of [the] antidiscrimination and accommodation requirements [of the ADA] are
parallel, for both seek to dismantle a system of group-based subordination and the
patterns of occupational segregation that support that system." Samuel R. Bagenstos,
"Rational Discrimination," Accommodation and the Politics of (Disability) Civil
Rights, 89 VA. L. REv. 825, 859 (2003) (emphasis added) (discussing the "normative
equivalence" of the requirements of traditional antidiscrimination and accommodation
statutes).
194. Thomas A. Mayes, Confronting Same-Sex, Student-to-Student Sexual
Harassment: Recommendations for Educators and Policy Makers, 29 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 641, 648 (2001) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) for the
proposition that "[t]he Supreme Court has long made clear that Congress enacted Title
VII in part to combat differential treatment based on sex stereotypes" (footnote
omitted)).
195. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1993). Hazen Paper
specifically addresses this possibility in terms of pensions and age discrimination, but
the statement is easily applied to all forms of proxy discrimination.
196. Id. at 613.
197. This would include both the claims of Blacks who are correctly identified
as such and perceived to be the wrong kind of Black, and Whites who are falsely
identified as Blacks, because in both cases the discrimination is premised upon race-
employers attempting to keep the workplace free of persons who through name, speech,
or other ascribed trait come to be associated with races that have been constructed to be
less socially acceptable.
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intricacies of borrowing such language would have to be worked
through, because not even the ADA provides a blanket correction for
merely wrongly identifying someone as disabled. The ADA provides
relief for persons who are disabled or "regarded as" having a
disability, 98 and defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an]
individual."' 99  This language supports granting relief where an
employer mistakenly believes that someone is disabled or where an
employer believes that an actual impairment, which is nonlimiting, is
substantially limiting. Using the ADA's definition of disability, courts
have concluded that the ADA encompasses claims by people who are
"regarded as" disabled and discriminated against as a result of a false
perception of disability and unfounded stereotypes about persons with
disabilities.200
It should be acknowledged that there are both challenges and limits
to courts' looking to the "regarded as" language of the ADA in
deciding Title VII cases. As a practical matter, one wishing to derail
such an approach could simply argue that because the "regarded as"
language does not appear in Title VII, courts should not be able to
consider the approach without a statutory amendment. While such an
amendment would be ideal, there is nothing that prevents a court from
using doctrinal analyses and understandings from other
antidiscrimination statutes to assist in understanding the operation of
discriminatory conduct within the Title VII context. 20' The turn to the
"regarded as" prong need not be understood as literal, but can be
encouraged as an intellectual tool to assist the court in answering the
critical question: "How is discrimination working?" The importance of
the specific language is that it could support an emboldened court's
claim that Congress understands that minority identity categories or
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(c) (2000).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(a) (2000).
200. See, e.g., Seifken v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th
Cir. 1995).
201. In fact, courts have looked to Title VII as a framework for structuring
causes of action under the ADA. See Talanda v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 140 F.3d
1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that, "the case law of Title VII serves as a useful
guide because its proscription against retaliation is quite comparable to the ADA's").
In addition, federal law has created some explicit procedural overlap between the
statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000). Section 12117(a) of the ADA states:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 705, 706, 707,
709, and 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be the powers, remedies,
and procedures this title provides to the Commission, to the Attorney
General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability
in violation of any provision of this Act ....
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perceived impairments are given power through social constructions
and understandings.
Setting the specific language to one side, however, a more general
look at the ADA can assist a court in realizing how proxy
discrimination might be understood to be discrimination based upon or
"because of' one's protected status. For example, perhaps the
absurdity of tolerating proxy discrimination within the Title VII context
would be exposed by asking whether a court would ever allow an
employer to argue that it was not discriminating based on a person's
disability, but on the fact that they used a wheelchair. The analogy is
extreme, but the point is that it is likely that courts would be very
skeptical if employers were to engage in Title VII-like proxy
discrimination within the ADA context. Additionally, referring back to
the way that same-race (or intra-group) decisions or color choices can
operate to protect employers within a Title VII analysis,2 2 it seems
very unlikely that courts would similarly allow an employer who
discriminated against a person with a severe mobility impairment to
claim they should not be held liable because they subjectively did not
regard the individual as impaired.2"3
The absence of statutory "regarded as" language in Title VII is
not the only problem with direct application of the "regarded as" prong
to proxy discrimination. In the ADA context, the language protects
persons from being wrongly identified as belonging to the category of
persons who are impaired. Within the context of this Article, such a
similar categorical misidentification would attach only to a white
Lakisha or Jamal. For the great many job applicants with black-
sounding names, the employer is correctly identifying their category.
The operation of misidentification or the use of misinformation on the
part of the employer is different in Title VII proxy cases than it is under
the ADA. The employers are, however, for all applicants, perceiving
impairment based on the assigned category-blackness-where no such
impairment exists. In other words, the point is not to suggest a direct
and literal application of the ADA's use of the "regarded as" provision,
202. See supra notes 42-45 (discussing how courts have rejected claims based
on race or color, where employers claim they believed the disfavored employee
belonged to the same identity group as the selected employee).
203. Interestingly, at least Justice Thomas has attempted to import the Title VII
limits stemming from intragroup decisions into an ADA analysis. Olmstead v. L.C.,
527 U.S. 581, 616-22 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, the majority rejected
Justice Thomas' argument that would have ostensibly required the plaintiffs to allege
some disparate treatment as compared to nondisabled persons. See id at 557 n.10.
For an excellent discussion of the issues surrounding this case, see Carlos A. Ball,
Lookiang for Theory in All the Rights Places: Feminist and Communitarian Elements of
Disability Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 105, 152-56 (2005).
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but to emphasize what the provision represents-an understanding that
discrimination takes place through assignments of individuals to
categories that convey lower social status. Black and white Lakishas
and Jamals are being assigned to a category that is viewed as
debilitated-ethnically named Blacks who employers understand to be
deficient or unsuitable based on social understandings of blackness.
In addition to textual and structural differences, there is also the
matter of limitations that have been placed on the "regarded as"
language within the context of the ADA. The congressional testimony
related to whether the ADA could regulate discrimination based upon
genetic information included an argument that a perceived impairment
cannot be disconnected from the requirement that said impairment
"substantially limit a major life activity." 204 That record suggested that
the "regarded as" language would not pertain where a covered
employer regarded the supposed impaired person as merely not capable
of performing some types of work.20 5 Only a belief that the disabled
person was completely incapable of working would satisfy the
"substantially limit[ed] in a major life activity" standard.0 6
204. Genetic Information in the Workplace: Hearing on Examining Issues
Relating to the Development of Federal Policy Governing the Treatment of an
Individual's Genetic Information in the Workplace in Light of the Recent Human
Genome Project Breakthroughs Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, 106th Cong. 63-69 (2000) (Statement of Harold P. Coxson, Esq., relating to
genetic information discrimination in the workplace) [hereinafter Hearing].
Interestingly, Professor Bagenstos has proposed that nothing in the ADA suggests that
the "regarded as having [a substantially limiting] impairment" prong has to be viewed
through the eyes of the employer. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma and
"Disability," 86 VA. L. Rv. 397, 447 (2000). Instead, requiring courts to take a
broader societal view of the individual's perceived disability might mitigate the
limitations the "major life activities" prong places on finding discrimination. Id. In
making the claim, he provides a helpful analogy to a restaurant owner who denies
service to a person with a disfiguring skin condition. Id. Where such a person
accurately perceived that he or she was being "regarded as" disabled by patrons, the
person is entitled to a remedy under the ADA, just as a black patron would be entitled
to a remedy under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if denied service based on the
complaints of bigoted patrons. Id. at 447-48.
205. Hearing, supra note 204, at 68.
206. Id.; see, e.g., EEOC v. General Electric Company, 17 F. Supp. 2d 824,
831 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (denying that the plaintiff had been "regarded as" disabled where
the defendant falsely believed the plaintiff was infected with HIV and harassed him
upon this basis, but the plaintiff had failed to establish the defendant believed HIV
infection substantially limited the plaintiff's ability to work or engage in another major
life activity); Talanda, 140 F.3d at 1098 (upholding termination of a manager who
refused to follow a direction to reassign an employee who lacked many teeth from
contact with the public as reasonable and concluding that the employee would not be
"regarded as" disabled since her impairment was not substantially limiting within the
meaning of the ADA); McCollough v. Atlanta Beverage Co., 929 F. Supp. 1489,
1496-98 (N.D. GA 1996) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim where it decided that the
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The congressional testimony is bolstered by the decision in a
Supreme Court case that considered the effect of the "regarded as"
disabled language in the ADA. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. the
Court accepted that the ADA protects those who are merely "regarded
as" being disabled, but not where the availability of corrective
measures would result in the presumably impaired being able to
function identically to those without impairments.27 The case and the
applicability of its holding within the Title VII context will be discussed
more fully below.2 °a Here, the important finding to take from the case
is the Court's determination that the "regarded as" prong is nullified
where there is no proof that the employer believed that the presumed
impairment substantially limited the claimants in the major life activity
of working. 20 9 As proof for this supposition, the Court noted that there
were several other types of positions that poorly sighted pilots would
have been able to perform at the airline.210
Despite the Court's tendency to narrow the class of individuals
protected under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's disability
definition, the previously referenced congressional testimony expressed
support for the Sutton Court's acknowledgement that the object of the
ADA is to prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities and
that the "regarded as" prong of the statute is necessary to prevent
employers from making decisions based upon "myths, fears, or
stereotypes." 21' In reviewing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the
predecessor to the ADA's "regarded as" prong), the Supreme Court
explained in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, "society's
accumulated myths and fears about the disability and disease [can be] as
employer correctly regarded the plaintiff as disabled and unable to do his assigned job,
but where the impairment did not prevent the plaintiff from working in other jobs).
207. 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (deciding an ADA discrimination claim
where pilots claimed that they were "regarded as" disabled based upon their impaired
vision that was correctable with the use of glasses or contact lenses). For an extended
analysis of this element of the Court's decision, see Bagenstos, supra note 204, at 514-
19 (praising the court's recognition that the "regarded as" prong was intended to
remedy the effects of stereotyping, but criticizing the Court's restrictive reading of the
statute).
208. See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
209. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92; see also Talanda, 140 F.3d at 1097 & n.13
("We do not mean to imply that facial disfigurement, including facial disfigurement
caused by dental problems, can never be a disability for purposes of the ADA. Such an
impairment can be so severe as to limit, or be perceived as limiting, the employee in a
major life activity.").
210. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493.
211. Heaing, supra note 204, at 68.
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handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment. ,21
2
Based upon the above cases and definitions, it is quite clear that
Title VII and the ADA share a common goal-eradicating the effects of
negative social constructions of outsider identities.2 3  Professor
Michael Stein addresses this commonality when he argues that majority
society views minority workers along a continuum of "physical
atypicality" where women, African Americans, and the physically
disabled are all atypical. 4 Society, he further contends, is merely
slowest to adjust to persons with those differences with which it is least
familiar.1 5 It is this shared experience of society using "markers" as a
shorthand for ascribed othemess that supports broadening Title VII to
cover lawsuits based upon the improper use of race-based proxies.
Indeed, such protection is necessary to further Title VII's goal of
eliminating the use of improper stereotypes pertaining to people who
belong to certain racial groups.
Although the ADA may differ from Title VII in a number of
ways ,216 it does not differ from Title VII in its purpose of stamping out
212. 180 U.S. 273, 275, 284 (1987).
213. The major policy justification for antidiscrimination laws, whether they
are designed to protect racial minorities or the disabled, are to remedy the injuries
arising from social stigma. Bagenstos, supra note 193, at 841-42 (arguing that across
categories of difference, the goal of antidiscrimination laws is to mitigate the social
inequality of subordinated group members); see also Bagenstos, supra note 204, at 426
(arguing that the ADA is premised upon the notion of the disabled as an identifiable
class of individuals who "share[] a common experience of systematic prejudice,
stereotypes and neglect."); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 189, at 5-11 (1996)
(noting that with the exception of the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision, the
central prohibitions of the ADA are borrowed from Title VII; and that both statutes
measure discrimination by looking to how employers treat those who are similarly
situated as compared to those who are different).
214. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 583-84 (2004).
215. Id.
216. See Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951,
977-78 (2003) (asserting that Congress took different approaches to remedying race and
disability discrimination, in that failure of employers to provide disabled persons
preferential treatment may be considered discrimination under the ADA, but Title VII
has no such provision); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 189, at 3 ("[U]nder the civil
rights statutes that protect women, blacks, or older workers, plaintiffs can complain of
discrimination against them, but they cannot insist upon discrimination in their
favor .... ") (footnote omitted); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue: Why Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REv. 603,
618-22 (2001) (articulating statutory differences and claiming that, while courts have
borrowed from Title VII analysis for ADA cases, discrimination based on disability,
which is often unintentional, is very different from race and gender discrimination,
which are often based on use of stereotypes or deliberate malfeasance); For a discussion
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employment decisions based purely on the social meanings attached to
membership in a marginalized group. 217 For this reason, it makes sense
that antidiscrimination law concerning race discrimination, like that
concerning disability discrimination, should include a means of
evaluating claims where a person is "regarded as" being black or as
belonging to any particular race in the hiring market.
The ADA prohibits discrimination by employers against qualified
individuals with a disability.218 Under the ADA, a plaintiff is disabled,
and thus entitled to protection, if: (1) she shows that she has a disability
as defined by the statute, meaning she is substantially limited in
performing one or more major life activities; (2) she shows that she has
a record of having such disability; or (3) she shows that she was
regarded as disabled by her employer.219 Returning to the Sutton case,
with respect to the "regarded as" prong of the ADA, the Supreme
Court explained that there are two ways in which a plaintiff may fall
within the statutory definition of being "regarded as" disabled: "(1) a
covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or
(2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. "220
These two methods of proving discrimination are recognized because of
an understanding that people are affected by negative and often
mistaken stereotypes about the capabilities of disabled people.221
of the accommodation requirements of the ADA, see Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination
and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REv. 642, 648 (2001). Jolls asserts that,
Even if the standard of intent is somewhat different under the disparate
treatment branch of Title VII (and it is not clear whether it is), it is clear
that no existing Title VII precedent has found disparate treatment liability
for behavior that is the Title VII analogue of neglecting the distinctive
building-access circumstances of individuals with disabilities.
Id.
217. Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The
breadth of the [ADA's] protection is the embodiment of its drafters' will to stamp out
the stereotyping of and discrimination against persons with disabilities in all their
forms, even when that stereotyping or discrimination is misplaced.").
218. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 478 (1999).
220. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
221. Statement of Representative Tony Coelho (Sept. 27, 1988), Legislative
History of Pub. L. 101-336, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Vol. 2, at 942-43
(Dec. 1990). According to Representative Coelho,
when a program, or a job, or a school, has excluded disabled people, or
segregated them in a separate facility, this has been justified through the
unchallenged myth of equating disability with inability .... Equating
disability with inability is false. In employment, for example, numerous
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These same factors and principles can and should be transferred to
an analysis of "regarded as" in disparate treatment race discrimination
cases. For example, the second method for proving disability
discrimination, where one is "regarded as" disabled because of an
actual, nonlimiting impairment, would essentially be similar to having a
black plaintiff, who was discriminated against either because of an
African American-sounding name or a black-sounding voice, bring a
claim alleging race discrimination based on his or her actual race,
which was perceived as limiting his or her ability due to negative
stereotypes such as black incompetence or laziness, but was mistakenly
perceived as being lazy and incompetent. Likewise, the first method
for proving disability discrimination, where one was "regarded as"
disabled because the "covered entity mistakenly believe[d] that" '222 the
plaintiff had an impairment that substantially limited a major life
activity, would essentially be similar to having a white plaintiff, who
was discriminated against either because of an African American-
sounding name or a black-sounding voice, file a lawsuit claiming race
discrimination on the ground that he or she was mistakenly believed to
be black and therefore "regarded as" having all the negative qualities
and stereotypes that are generally associated with Blacks, even though
the plaintiff was not actually black.
This direct application of ADA language and case law, however, is
not perfect. As we discussed above, there are times where it is possible
that a person could regard someone as impaired but not trigger the
ADA.22 3 This seems much less likely within the Title VII context,
where the presupposition about race and its import would appear to be
almost per se violative of the statute. While the statutes may not
necessarily operate in precisely the same manner, it still makes sense to
attempt to regulate the underlying offending behaviors in both race and
disability-based decision-making.
studies have shown that employment for the disabled is restricted more by
misconceptions, stereotypes, and generalizations about handicaps,
unfounded fears about increased costs and decreased productivity, and
outright prejudice, than by people's disabilities themselves.
Id.
222. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
223. In the Sutton case, the Supreme Court used diabetics as an example of
persons with a condition that could be considered a disability under certain
circumstances, but is not necessarily so under the ADA. Id. at 483-84; see also Tory
L. Lucas, Disabling Complexity: The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Its
Interaction with Other Federal Laws, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 871, 884 (2005)
(discussing EEOC guidelines and stating that just because a person qualifies as having a
"serious health condition" under the Family and Medical Leave Act that does not mean
that they are regarded as disabled under the ADA).
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CONCLUSION
Prior to concluding, we want to acknowledge that while it is
critical that courts begin to grapple with how the socially constructed
nature of race shapes discrimination within employment and other
contexts, importing the ADA's "regarded as" language into Title VII
represents only one methodological starting point for beginning to
address the problem. Given the scope and nature of problems related to
societal understandings of race and identity, the approach is neither a
panacea nor a solution free of problems. We recognize there are
challenges that result from borrowing the ADA's "regarded as"
language. For instance, the recognition of proxy claims could
significantly increase the bases upon which claimants could file causes
of actions. Additionally, although Bertrand and Mullainathan's
research provided a starting place for analyzing the labor market costs
of behaviors premised upon social constructions of race, the research
was limited only to exploring the disadvantages associated with African
American-sounding names. As other research and our analysis in this
paper suggests, proxy discrimination is not just an issue of white-on-
black discrimination.224 There will be complications for Title VII
"regarded as" claims, which may arise outside the context of the black-
white binary understanding of race.
First, as we have discussed, names are merely one method of
approximating a job candidate's ascribed "otherness." We have
covered other bases for discrimination, such as accents or speech
224. See supra notes 82, 108-14, 165-75 and accompanying text. The tendency
of scholars to focus far too much of the racial discourse upon how race operates in the
context of black-white social relations, thereby obscuring the lived experiences of the
many other minority identity groups, is typically referred to as the black-white binary
paradigm. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The
"Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1214-15
(1997) (demonstrating the existence of the paradigm and how it operates to exclude
Latinos from inclusion in racial discourse); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Critical
Race Histories: In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187, 1200-03 (2004) (discussing the
uniqueness of the black experience with racism and white power within the context of
multiracial politics, but ultimately concluding that an overemphasis on the black-white
binary paradigm unacceptably hinders the racial discourse); Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship and the
Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1196-1200 (1997) (book review)
(discussing the doctrinal and practical consequences of the paradigm and arguing that as
a symbol it stands for the premise that Blacks are the only oppressed group who
deserve to have their racial grievances addressed); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor
White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 248-
50 (1995) (describing the binary paradigm as a type of "bipolar essentialism" and
discussing its effect on Asian Americans).
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vernacular.225 We have not thoroughly covered how markers that may
correlate with race, such as credit history,22 6  education,"' or
geography22 (residing in, or hailing from a neighborhood or area with a
significant minority population), can be used in a similar fashion. It is
not even possible to construct a comprehensive list of all of the
conditions or behaviors that constitute proxies. Borrowing the
"regarded as" language would likely result in proxy cases significantly
expanding the Title VII docket. 29 This result is somewhat unavoidable.
Part of the development of proxy discrimination jurisprudence would
necessarily involve discerning between which types of ascriptive traits
most highly correlate with race and the other protected Title VII
225. See supra notes 14, 102-23 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Latinos
might be understood to have claims based on multiple traits, meaning they could
potentially claim discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and national origin.
226. See supra note 56. The same claim could really be made for any income-
related distinction or category, as many minority groups are disproportionately poor.
See Beck, supra note 20 (discussing Section 8 status as linked to income level, which
may be a proxy for race and other protected classes); Rachel Rubey, There's No Place
Like Home: Housing for the Most Vulnerable Individuals with Severe Mental
Disabilities, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1736-38 (2002) (noting that courts have upheld
discrimination based on minimum income requirements for renting in the private
housing market, which in effect legitimates discrimination against the mentally disabled
in housing since they are disproportionately low-income individuals).
227. For instance, attendance at a historically black college or university breaks
down heavily along racial lines and one might expect that for some employers, seeing
references to Spelman or Morehouse colleges on a rdsum6, might be tantamount to
seeing the names Lakisha or Jamal.
228. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of
Segregation: "Hewing a Stone of Hope From a Mountain of Despair, " 143 U. PA. L.
REv. 1233, 1235-36 (1995) (discussing the racialization of space: "the process by
which residential location and community are carried and placed on racial identity" and
noting "I take my meaning from Susan Smith, who characterizes the term to be 'the
process by which residential location is taken as an index of the attitudes, values,
behavioural inclinations and social norms of the kinds of people who are assumed to
live [there]"' (citing Susan J. Smith, Residential Segregation and the Politics of
Racialization, in RACISM, THE CITY AND THE STATE 128, 133 (Malcolm Cross &
Michael Keith eds., 1993))). Society then uses such information to perfect practices
such as red-lining-"a discriminatory practice by banks or insurance companies
whereby the potential customer is denied a loan or insurance coverage because of the
neighborhood in which the subject property is located." Terry W. Gentle, Jr.,
Comment, Rethinking Conciliation under the Fair Housing Act, 67 TENN. L. Ruv. 425,
442 n. 129 (2000).
229. This result alone may be a reason why courts seem extremely hesitant to
adopt such a remedy. Although as one scholar has pointed out, even if the doctrine
gains a foothold, courts find ways to effectively limit "litigation explosions" in the area
of race-related discrimination claims. See Brooks, supra note 42, at 14-15 (alleging
that, in response to increased filings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), courts found ways
to limit the effectiveness of the filings).
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categories.23° Moreover, it would require more work for administrative
agencies and courts that adjudicate employment discrimination claims,
but it would also force these entities to come to grips with the way
racism (and other -isms) are often practiced-unconsciously and
through proxies.
Beyond the challenges associated with the myriad types of proxies
that exist, there will be issues arising from the fact that not all races are
similarly socially or legally constructed. Again, various studies
allowed us to explore the harmful consequences of blackness, a racial
category for which negative societal stereotypes are prevalent. 3' Being
"regarded as" a Black is clearly punitive within the employment context
because of socially ascribed stereotypes. We do not, however, have
either the data or a developed record of social relations to make the
same types of claims for other races and ethnicities.
For example, some of the studies we have analyzed suggest that
Latinos also experience serious disadvantages in access to employment
230. As one scholar has asserted, proxies essentially serve as a type of social
short hand for marking group difference, and not all proxies are bad: "Employers (like
everyone else) treat individuals as members of groups all the time; we could not
manage all of the information in the world if we did not act on the basis of proxies."
Bagenstos, supra note 193, at 855 (citation omitted). The goal of this Article is to
make real the author's additional claim that "antidiscrimination law [should] bracket[]
out one set of proxies (those based on race, gender, and the other forbidden
classifications) and prohibit[] employers from relying on the proxies in that set." Id. at
865 (citation omitted). While empirical data of the type discussed in this Article can be
helpful to legal decision-makers, such evidence will not exist for many proxy
categories. Part of the challenge to implementing the proxy discrimination cause of
action will be in the courts' ability to "know it when they see it." See Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (making the same comment,
somewhat in jest, about pornography).
231. Within the context of a discussion of the crippling effects of racial
stereotypes, Professor Jody Armour has referred to the consequences of such
stereotypes as a type of "black tax" or "the price Black people pay for their encounters
with Whites (and some Blacks) because of Black stereotypes." JODY D. ARMOUR,
NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN
AMERICA 13 (1997). The breadth of such costs is astutely captured in the following
passage:
Race, gender, and disability stereotypes are not likely to be
idiosyncratic to a particular employer, nor are they likely to be limited
to the employment context. When a person loses out on a job because
of such a stereotype, that loss is likely to be only the tip of the iceberg.
Similar stereotypes are likely to foreclose other jobs and opportunities
in society. A person subject to such a stereotype is therefore likely to
face stigmatic and cumulative disadvantage.
Bagenstos, supra note 193, at 854.
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and housing through proxy discrimination.2 32 In the structure we have
proposed, the "regarded as" prong attaches remedies only where one
can prove both that the employer has used some proxy for the protected
category and that persons within the relevant category are socially
constructed as undesirable. Thus, we would be able to support claims
of negative social construction for Latinos, and in our post-September
1 1th society, the same would likely be true of persons possessing traits
that revealed them to be of Arab descent or Islamic faith.2 33 However,
other races and ethnicities would be more difficult to adjudge. For
instance, in this Article, we cite to a study indicating that some Asians
were discriminated against in the temporary services employment
industry.3 Also, the Fragante case involved a claimant of Filipino
descent, and Professor Mari Matsuda makes the case that Mr. Fragante
and other Asians may be socially constructed as the undesirable "other"
232. See Bendick et al., supra note 14, at 29-31 (reporting that in two separate
sets of study data, Latino tester applicants respectively experienced a twenty percent
(UI study) to twenty-two percent (FEC study) disadvantage in treatment by prospective
employers); Purnell et al., supra note 105, at 14-15 (finding that persons presumed
Latino by voice, for example, those subjects using the Chicano English dialect,
received the least number of appointments to view rental properties, as compared to
persons using Standard American English or African American Vernacular English).
233. Interestingly, at least one federal appeals court has implicitly dealt with
the significance of names and the social construction of identity by ruling that an
employer's insistence on substituting an American-sounding name in place of an Arab
employee's ethnic-sounding name was racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (2000). EI-Hakem v. BJY, Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2005). While
this is not precisely a proxy discrimination matter, the court recognized how attitudes
toward a name reflect racial bias. See supra note 82. Professor Adrien Katherine
Wing has described the more recent disfavor directed toward Arabs as similar to that
Blacks have historically been subjected to in the United States. See Adrien Katherine
Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and
the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 718-21 (2003) (asserting that, post-
September 1lth, Arabs "have been socially constructed as 'Black,' with the negative
legal connotations historically attributed to that designation. For example, racial
profiling, which originated as a term synonymous with Blacks and police traffic stops,
now equally applies to both Arabs and Muslims in many contexts." (footnote omitted));
see also Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights and Immigration
Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 299 (2002) (noting the U.S. Government has recently been
subjecting Arabs and Muslims to "[a] complex matrix of 'otherness' based on race,
national origin, religion, culture, and political ideology"); Thomas W. Joo, Presumed
Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race Before
and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) ("In the wake of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Arab, South Asian, and Muslim Americans
have borne the brunt of the presumptions of foreignness and disloyalty."); Leti Volpp,
The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1592 (2002) (noting that, after
September 11 th, even persons of Arab descent who have been naturalized or were born
here were not considered American citizens "as a matter of identity").
234. See supra note 82.
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based upon origin and accent.235 While we accept these claims as
authentic, there is data that suggests that Asians and perhaps Pacific
Islanders are often believed to be an academically superior, socially
acceptable, "model minority., 236  Based on beliefs in this type of
positive stereotype, one might expect Asian names to generate
disproportionate positive interest when they appear on rdsum6s for
certain permanent jobs.237 Would this mean employers could claim
there would be no harm in being "regarded as" Asian?23s On the other
hand, at least one study suggests that Asian Americans may be more
susceptible to discrimination because of stereotypes about docility in
that employers, in this case temporary employment agencies, "may
believe that they can ignore r6sum6s submitted by Asian American
without fear of a complaint or a civil rights investigation, which they
might more likely receive if they ignored a member of another ethnic
group. ,
239
That some races are associated with positive social constructions or
stereotypes presents other problems as well. Even where a minority
group is thought to have positive traits, there may be some confusion as
to who is included in the group. Asians, like Latinos, present the
challenge of often being referred to as a monolith when each of these
groups is actually extremely heterogeneous. 2' For the purposes of our
235. SeeMatsuda, supra note 166, at 1384-86, 1392-1401.
236. Many scholars have challenged this myth, which has been described as
follows: "The model minority stereotype posits Asian Americans as uniquely successful
among minority groups. They work hard, save money, and achieve material success,
while their children study equally hard and earn high marks in school." Shin, supra
note 94, at 3; see also Frank H. Wu, Changing America: Three Arguments About
Asian Americans and the Law, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 811, 813-14 (1996).
237. Such a finding would comport with findings in the Figlio study that Asian
children with distinctively Asian names such as "Vivek" were more likely to be
referred to gifted programs and to have higher mathematics test scores than Asian
children with "whiter" names like "Alex." Figlio, supra note 73, at 19-20.
238. As Frank H. Wu indicates, the problem with the model minority myth is
not only that people ignore that it is, in fact, a myth based upon stereotypes, but also
that it is typically offered as empirical proof or evidence for whatever legal claim is
being advanced. See Wu, supra note 224, at 818-19. Reliance on the myth can,
however, be as dangerous as it is potentially advantageous. Even as one employer
might use stereotypes related to the myth to suggest that Asians will perform certain
types of jobs well, the reverse side of the essentialist ploy is the notion that Asians
cannot do well in certain other types of jobs. At bottom, it is just another version of
seeking the "right kind" of employee that we discussed in the context of the black
identity performance at work. See supra notes 135-43, 149-53 and accompanying text.
239. Names Make a Difference, supra note 82, at 4.
240. See Let Volpp, "Obnoxious To Their Very Nature".- Asian Americans
and Constitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71, 72 n. 1 (2001) (stating that experiences
of persons of Japanese and Chinese ancestry are often regarded as synonymous with the
Asian American experience, when actually "[t]here are enormous differences within the
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new prong of Title VII jurisprudence, questions will arise from societal
tendencies to interchangeably and simultaneously use race as a
reference to appearance, nationality, ethnicity, and culture.24' Are
Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese persons "regarded as" the same? Is a
Cuban a Latino? Would an employer be able to defend against a proxy
suit brought by a Thai person where the employer admitted to generally
using proxies to disfavor Asians but asserted as his defense that he did
not consider Thai folks Asian and he "kind of' knew that Thai names
did not sound like most Asian names? How would one handle the
claims of a recent African immigrant who has an African-sounding
name? Is the social construction of African or Caribbean immigrant
identity something separate and different from that of constructions for
blackness as embodied by African Americans?242 The immigrant may
identity category 'Asian American' along lines of class, gender, immigration history,
and sexuality, as well as along lines of ancestry"); see also Celious & Oyserman, supra
note 186, at 150-51 (making a similar claim about the heterogeneity of the African
American community).
241. Most of the questions relate to the limited effectiveness of larger "racial"
categories for capturing more nuanced forms of identity affiliation. The following
passage is generally descriptive of the nature of the problem:
The history of discrimination against Mexican-Americans differs from that
of Cuban-Americans, though both groups are lumped together with Puerto
Ricans, Dominicans, Central Americans, and others under the classification
"Hispanic." Although Haitians are considered black, their status as recent
immigrants and the language barriers they face can separate and exclude
them from more established segments of the African-American community.
Filipinos, though classified as Asians, experienced a unique history of
oppression at the hands of Spanish and American colonialists. Koreans still
resent their country's historical oppression by Japan. And Japanese and
Chinese cultures and militaries have often clashed. Yet, in the eyes of the
Census Bureau, as well as the courts and legislatures, in implementing race-
conscious remedies, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, and Chinese are all
classified as "Asian." An additional accounting problem arises with
Latinos because the Census Bureau classifies this group as an ethnicity,
even though many Latinos are also black or Asian. In other words, the
census currently counts people on the basis of race, but ethnicity transcends
race in the case of Latinos.
Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment.- It's Not Just Black and White
Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REv. 957, 963 (1995).
242. Separate from the name issue, there are questions related to the different
social perceptions that may operate with regard to African or Caribbean immigrants
versus the descendants of slaves in this country. See, e.g., John H. McWhorter,
What's Holding Blacks Back?, CITY J., Winter 2001, at 24-31 (contrasting the
educational failure of American Blacks to the relative success of the children of African
and Caribbean immigrants as part of his claim that it is American Blacks' belief in
themselves as victims, rather than racism, that accounts for their lack of success). The
black immigrant divide is often mentioned during discussions of who should benefit
from race-based programs and remedies. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 42, at 13-16
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identify as black, but does he or she have the same claim as Blacks with
African American-sounding names? Does the employer who sees the
African name on a r6sum6 even use it as a proxy for race?
24 3
The above questions make it clear that, like race in general and
identity politics more specifically, regulating proxy discrimination
could become very complicated. Even so, these types of problems do
not make the "regarded as" standard unworkable. Just like in other
cases, the plaintiff will be responsible for identifying the employer's
impermissible conduct. The employer then will need to offer a reason
for the conduct premised on something other than direct or proxy
discrimination. If at this point courts then have to make hard choices
between strong and weak evidence of proxies, then these choices are an
appropriate consequence. Again, this process at least forces courts to
acknowledge discrimination as the complex phenomenon it is.
While we accept that proxy discrimination complaints expand the
ambit of Title VII jurisprudence because the potential number of
proxies is substantial and racial categories are typically messy subjects,
there can be some limitations. For instance, although we would
provide remedies to a white Lakisha and Jamal, we would not offer the
same to a white Billy Bob or Peggy Sue, even where their names were
also the source of employment discrimination. Similarly, we would
deny these same persons relief if they were denied employment because
of geography, such as their southern or rural roots, which may also be
used as proxies. These claims could be alleged to be cognizable as
race-based because a person who bypasses a white Billy Bob or
someone he believes to be southern or rural may be acting based upon
stereotypes and attempting to exclude the "wrong type" of white
person. In this way, the discrimination looks somewhat like the
exclusion practiced against white persons with African American-
sounding names. The differences, however, are that the exclusion of
(discussing the exceptional history of subordination borne by African Americans since
the earliest days of our Republic and why it matters to remedies for discrimination); S.
Allen Counter, Descendants of American Slaves, THE BLACK COLLEGIAN, Feb. 2002
(discussing the unique debt America owes to the descendants of slaves as opposed to
Blacks more generally, in an article written by a Harvard Medical School neuroscience
professor); Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, But
Which Ones, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 2004, at Al (discussing the concerns of Professors
Lani Guinier and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., that while eight percent of Harvard's students
were black, potentially only a third had four grandparents who were born in the United
States). The distinction is also prominently discussed within the context of the
reparations for slavery movement. See, e.g., Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts?
Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2543-46 (2001).
243. Neither the Bertrand and Mullainathan study nor the Figlio study answers
the question of whether African names, such as Barak Obama, trigger the same type of
discrimination as names such as Lakisha and Jamal.
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whiteness is not the impetus for the behavior nor is the white race
category typically socially constructed as inferior. The employer
avoiding the southern-named or rural-living white person is making
decisions based on socioeconomic background or perhaps stereotypes
based on geographical customs, but not upon race or another protected
Title VII trait. It is this requirement that the claim implicate a negative
social construction of a protected Title VII category that becomes the
limitation on more innovative proxy claims.244
In conclusion, judicial recognition of race-based proxy
discrimination as actionable in hiring discrimination cases would not
only be more effective in remedying race discrimination as it functions
on the job market for applicants, but also would help to deter such
discrimination by forcing employers to pay for any decisions that rest
on proxies for race. Moreover, it would further the purposes of Title
VII by creating a space in which insiders or members of the dominant
racial group can be compensated for discrimination against them when
they too are perceived as racial minorities and "disabled" or lacking in
ability because of their racial status. In the same way that the socially
constructed racial meanings or proxies, such as name or voice, underlie
discrimination against minorities based on signals of race, they also
enable discrimination against majority members, not only because of
such signals, but also based on their views, which may, according to
social definitions, be considered as thinking too much like a racial
244. The support for such a claim can be seen by comparing this example to
the findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan's research. In that study, African American-
sounding names became proxies for the Blacks whom employers did not wish to hire.
Such a practice resulted in the creation of at least one group that could be described as
consisting of false positives-acceptable job candidates whom are erroneously
eliminated through use of the practice-white (or any nonblack) persons with African
American-sounding names. One could argue that Blacks who did not conform to the
behavioral conventions that the employers thought the names signified are also false
positives, but this is less clear because it may just be that only the disfavored name
(African American-sounding) combined with the disfavored race (Blacks) was needed to
satisfy the unacceptable choice (any African American-named Black). We have
essentially argued that false positives like the white Jamal and Lakisha should receive
Title VII protection because their exclusion is also based on race in that the choice to
exclude them is premised upon negative social understandings of blackness. In the
Billy Bob example, however, where is the false positive? There does not appear to be
one because the employer is trying to exclude all applicants with the name, not Blacks
or Whites in particular. In this example, the black Billy Bob would be without Title
VII remedy just like the white Billy Bob because stilted racial constructions are not the
impetus for the behavior. This, of course, presents a paradox that will have to be dealt
with on an ad hoc basis within proxy cases. In the case of African American-sounding
names, an employer treating all similarly named persons the same tends to prove the
power of the racist construction in effect. Treating all applicants the same in other
contexts, however, may serve to prove there was no unlawful discrimination present.
In other words, intentions really do matter for this type of disparate intent claim.
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minority, along with any attendant negative stereotypes. Indeed, this
expanded understanding of Title VII case law will only work to further
the goals of Title VII and to effectuate the intent of its drafters, who
certainly understood, as so many of us do, that it is not physical race
itself that is damaging, but the social meanings that are attached to race
that are dangerous and must be eradicated. 45
245. At a minimum, we believe that Congress should make this understanding
of racial discrimination explicit by adding the "regarded as" language to Title VII
legislation concerning racial discrimination.
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